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Abstract 
 
  This research examined the potential financial and non-financial benefits of 
working towards reengineering the Department of Defense (DoD) through the adaptation 
of a functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure.  Based on historical analysis of 
the DoD’s current structure, a proposed DoD structure is presented that aligns operational 
functions under functional corps and support functions under existing defense-wide 
agencies and field activities.  An analysis of overlapping functionality between services 
provided the basis for quantitative analysis of size-of-force and budget request data for 
Fiscal Year 2013 (FY2013).  This analysis enabled the comparison of operational 
efficiency between services.  These rates were used to benchmark operational efficiency 
across the DoD.  An estimate of savings for each function was assessed by comparing the 
actual budget request for FY2013 against the estimated budget request under the 
proposed structure.  Through sensitivity analysis, estimated savings from these functional 
areas ranged between $7 Billion and $100 Billion for FY2013.  Analysis of existing 
literature highlighted non-financial implications of adopting a functionally-aligned, 
unified DoD structure.  Recommendations for future research include the need for an 
Activity-Based Costing and Budgeting system to identify actual costs of DoD functions.              
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TOWARDS REENGINEERING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE:   A FINANCIAL CASE FOR A FUNCTIONALLY-ALIGNED, UNIFIED 
MILITARY STRUCTURE 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background   
 
The United States Government (USG) currently faces a fiscally-unbalanced 
environment.  In the 15 seconds it took to type this sentence, the federal debt grew 
another $400,000 USD (US National Debt Clock).  Representing approximately 17 
percent of the USG’s $3.8 Trillion USD in outlays for fiscal year (FY) 2014, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) can either be part of the budgetary problem or contribute 
to the fiscal solution (National Priorities Project).  Recently, the inability of Congress to 
pass a deliberate budget resulted in the implementation of sequestration measures.  These 
measures indiscriminately cut 10 percent from most USG departments, to include the 
DoD.  Sequestration seeks to reduce spending across USG programs, regardless of the 
program’s operating efficiency.  Essentially, sequestration is a stop-gap measure to 
temporarily address symptoms of an inefficient system.  However, as Michael Hammer 
and James Champy explain in their book, Reengineering the Corporation, to affect 
lasting change, organizations must fundamentally rethink business operations; they must 
reengineer processes (Hammer & Champy, 1993).   
The need to reengineer the current DoD structure, and the processes inherent 
within, goes beyond fiscal considerations.  The USG budgetary situation is a real and 
present threat to America’s national security.  The ability of the DoD to maintain an 
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effective force, capable of executing the National Security Strategy, is contingent upon a 
federal budget that resources all required military functions.   According to the DoD’s FY 
2013 Budget Proposal, these requirements resulted in a defense budget request of $526.2 
Billion USD.  This budget request is an assemblage of inputs through the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process by which military 
services identify requirements, which military departments translate into budget requests 
that are consolidated and submitted by the DoD.   
Currently, the DoD is aligned by departments:  Army, Navy, and Air Force; and 
services:  Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.  These services are resourced to 
organize, train, and equip forces to provide certain functional capability to combatant 
commanders (Figure 1, DoD Organizational Structure).   
Figure 1.  DoD Organizational Structure (Organization and Management Planning) 
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Title 10, US Code, defines the role of the military by department and service.  
DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 
Components, provides amplifying guidance on the functions of military departments and 
services.  To be clear, although the terms role, mission, function, and process are often 
used interchangeably, the terms are not synonymous.  The term role is defined by the 
2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) Report as: 
Role:  The broad and enduring purposes for which the Services…were established 
by law.  (QRM Report, 2009:4) 
 
Additionally, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, defines mission and function as follows: 
Mission:  The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to 
be taken and the reason therefore.  (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010:183) 
 
Function:  The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is 
designed, equipped, and trained. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010:115) 
 
Hammer & Champy define process as follows: 
 
 Process:  A collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of input and 
creates an output that is of value to the customer. (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 38) 
  
 The distinction between processes and functions, especially with regard to 
reengineering, is an important one.  The fundamental difference is one of customer focus.  
This distinction will be discussed in greater detail at the end of Chapter 2.   
A synopsis of department and service functions, as defined in DODD 5100.01, is 
attached in Appendix 1.  This synopsis highlights the degree of functional overlap 
between military components.  Of note, this functional overlap exists in spite of DoD 
direction for Secretaries of the Military Departments to: 
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Coordinate with the other Military Departments and all of the other DoD 
Components to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical 
administration; eliminate duplication; and assist other DoD Components in the 
accomplishment of their respective functions…(Emphasis Added) (DODD 
5100.01, Enclosure 6, 2010; 26)   
 
To eliminate duplication, functions must be clearly defined and apportioned 
between services.  In an organization as big and complex as the DoD, this becomes 
extremely challenging. One approach to reducing duplication is through military service 
unification.   
Current DoD attempts at service unification focus on joint-basing initiatives at the 
tactical and operational level and unified combatant commands at the strategic level.  
Joint basing efforts pair bases from different services that are geographically proximate 
and consolidates base-level support functions.  In addition to joint basing, under the 
purview of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the DoD operates three functional 
combatant commands:  US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM), and US Special Forces Command (USSOCOM) and six 
geographic combatant commands:  US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US European 
Command (USEUCOM), US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), US Central 
Command (USCENTCOM), US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and US Africa 
Command (USAFRICOM).  However, the DoD does not organize, train, nor equip forces 
to perform functions jointly; they simply execute functional missions under a joint 
purview.   
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Problem Statement 
  
The current service-based DoD structure is functionally redundant and fiscally 
inefficient.  Working towards reengineering the DoD, by adopting a functionally-aligned 
structure, may reduce the DoD’s fiscal footprint. 
 
Research Objectives/Investigative Questions 
The objective of this research is to assess the potential fiscal savings of the DoD 
reengineering towards a functionally-aligned, unified structure.  To accomplish this, a 
thorough evaluation of the current DoD budget request is required.  This assessment must 
examine which functions each military service provides to combatant commanders and at 
what price.  Special consideration shall be given to areas of overlapping functionality.  
Understanding the current structure provides a springboard by which to examine 
alternative structural designs.  In this vein, the research gives consideration to countries 
that have adopted a unified, functionally-aligned military structure in addition to 
proposed models for the US DoD.  Finally, given a modified military structure, this study 
assesses non-financial benefits that the DoD might realize, should it reengineer.  To 
address the objective of this thesis, three investigative questions (IQ) are posed:       
IQ 1.  What functional areas overlap between military services? 
IQ 2.  Could the DoD reduce its budget requests by adopting a functionally-
aligned, unified structure? 
IQ 3.  What are the non-financial implications of a functionally-aligned, unified 
structure? 
 
 
Research Focus 
 
 This research primarily examines current and proposed DoD organizational 
structures from a fiscal perspective.  The impetus for this research stems from the current 
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USG fiscal challenges.  As highlighted in Chapter 2, most research on the topic of 
implementing a functionally-aligned unified military is theoretical, arguing the perceived 
merits and concerns of reorganizing the current DoD structure.  Very little quantitative 
research exists on the fiscal savings of such a reorganizational effort.  The complexity 
and immensity of the current DoD structure and budget request process, issues that will 
be addressed separately in following chapters, limits the scope of this research to a 
macro-level focus.  This study does not analyze every role, mission, and function 
performed by the DoD.  Nor does it account for every dollar the DoD spends, or requests, 
in each fiscal year.  Instead, this research examines the core functions of military 
departments and services and the budget requests to provide these functions.  The study 
focuses on the DoD’s Budget Request for one fiscal year, FY2013.  The organizational 
changes proposed in this study are not intended as detailed blueprints for DoD 
reengineering.  Instead, the research should be viewed as an azimuth by which future 
discussions, research, and decisions might be based.   
 
Methodology 
 
 This research is supported by three legs:  1)  Qualitative content analysis of 
overlapping functions by military service and non-financial benefits of a functionally-
aligned force structure 2)  Quantitative assessment of the size of force provided by 
function, by service and 3)  Quantitative analysis of budget requests associated with each 
function, by service.  Content analysis of Title 10 USC, DODD 5100.01, other joint 
publications, and related academic literature provides a framework of overlapping 
military service functions.  Content analysis of existing literature provides a register of 
 
 
7 
 
non-financial benefits to reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned 
organizational structure.  Quantitative size-of-force data is collected from service budget 
justification books, service and joint factsheets, and related academic literature.  
Quantitative budget data is collected from the DoD’s FY2013 Budget Request.  By 
comparing budget requests per function by service, in like size-of-force units, the 
research identifies the lowest budget request by function between services.  This baseline 
per-function figure is benchmarked across all services to form a baseline fiscal savings 
figure over the current DoD structure.   
 
Assumptions/Limitations 
 The vast extent of this research inherently increases the number and scope of 
assumptions made.  First, it is assumed that the data provided within the FY13 DoD 
Budget Proposal is accurate and representative of actual resource expenditures.  Second, 
without a sole source document on size-of-force data, it is assumed that the 
conglomerated data accurately represents the current force.  Third, in analyzing military 
structures from other countries, it is assumed that a similar structure could be scaled up to 
the US DoD.  Fourth, the non-financial benefits presented in response to IQ 3 are feasible 
and valid.  Finally, and perhaps must fundamentally, it is assumed that the methodology 
for this research will provide meaningful estimates of potential fiscal savings.  In theory, 
comparing average price per unit of function provided is a valid approach to assessing 
fiscal savings, in practice; fiscal savings may be elusive in an organization as vast as the 
DoD. 
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Likewise, the scope of the research problem yields several limitations.  First, the 
link between the functions provided by military services and the budget requests 
associated with those functions is not always clear.  While the DoD utilizes Budget 
Activity Codes (BAC) to appropriate funds to specific functions, these codes vary by 
service for the same function.  The accuracy of the analysis is limited to by the correct 
interpretation of BACs and the functions they represent.  Second, this study is limited in 
scope to macro-level core service functions and associated budget requests.  The fiscal 
savings presented represent an order of magnitude estimate, not precise financial figures.  
Finally, the research does not address the political, social, and cultural issues that would 
inherently arise from such a dramatic change from the current DoD structure.    
 
Implications 
 This research will open lines of dialogue for discussing the roles, missions, 
functions, and processes of the DoD’s military services.   Additionally, this research will 
highlight areas of overlapping functionality within the DoD.  This overlapping 
functionality drives associated budget requests.  By analyzing these budget requests and 
proposing a revised DoD organizational structure to reduce them, the study may allow the 
DoD to realize significant fiscal savings in the long run.  These long run fiscal savings 
may provide options to DoD leaders that desire to move beyond addressing the symptoms 
of an inefficient system to reengineering the system itself.    
  
Summary 
 
  Sequestration, civilian furloughs, and potential diminishing force capabilities are 
symptoms of an inefficient DoD structure in a fiscally-constrained USG environment.   
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This study addresses the current service-based DoD structure, which is functionally 
redundant and fiscally inefficient.  Working towards reengineering through adopting a 
functionally-aligned, unified organization, may reduce the DoD’s fiscal footprint.  The 
Literature Review in the next chapter provides a historical perspective on the current 
DoD structure, assesses current literature relating to functionally-aligned unified military 
structures, and discusses the concept of reengineering and its application to the DoD.  
Chapter 3 details the methodology by which the functions, size of force, and budget data 
from different services merge to form a comprehensive fiscal analysis of the current DoD 
structure.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis as they relate to the three IQs.  
Finally, conclusions from analysis of the results are presented, to include 
recommendations for future research and use within the DoD.   
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
 
 A review of existing literature on the topic is structured in three sections.  First, a 
review of the history behind the current DoD organizational structure to include the US 
Constitution, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  
Second, an appraisal of current unified force structures in use by other countries and an 
examination of proposed models for the DoD.  Finally, a review of methodologies used to 
estimate the effectiveness of organizational reengineering.   
 
History 
 
 Constitution of the United States 
 
 On July 4, 1776, the First Continental Congress approved final edits to a 
document that shaped history as few documents have done before or since.   The 
Declaration of Independence, although not signed by members of Congress until August 
2, 1776, was born that day; and with it, radical ideas on freedom, liberty, and democracy 
that have since shaped the world (The Charters of Freedom).  The Declaration was a line 
in the proverbial sand of English tyrannical rule.  It summarized “self-evident truths” by 
presenting before the world a list of grievances against the King.  It was the impetus for a 
war of independence and the guiding light that led a fledgling country to freedom.  11 
years later, a second, equally important, but fundamentally different, document was 
penned by members of the Constitutional Convention—the Constitution of the United 
States.  The Declaration of Independence was, in the terminology of Hammer & Champy, 
a “case for action.”  It defined where the country stood and why it could no longer remain 
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there.  The Constitution was a “vision document,” detailing what the country must 
become.  (Hammer & Champy, 1993).   
 Adopted on September 17, 1787, the Constitution was eventually ratified by 
conventions in eleven states before taking effect on March 4, 1789 (The Charters of 
Freedom, 2013).  The primary objective of the document was to clearly define the role of 
the central government in the affairs of states and in the lives of individual citizens.  The 
Constitution, as with most important documents, was written out of necessity.  If the 
United States was to become a truly unified country, it required a firm foundation on 
which to build a “more perfect union.”  Of primary importance to this research is Article 
One, Section Eight:  Powers of Congress.   
 Under Section Eight, the powers enumerated to congress are established.  These 
powers include several pertaining to the establishment and organization of a military. 
Specifically:    
 The Congress shall have power … 
 
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be 
for a longer Term than two Years; 
 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and 
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress;  (Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8) 
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Understanding the need for a “common defence,” Congress retained the power to 
form an Army and a Navy.  Congress also understood the need to organize military forces 
in such a way that they might be effectively employed in service to the United States.  
The organization of the US Military, both at present, and over the past 226 years is rooted 
in these articles.  The first major organizational step for the US Military was the 
establishment of the War Department.   
While the Continental Army was formed in 1775, the War Department wasn’t 
formally established until 1789 (Keskel, 2002).  In 1798, in response to the advancement 
of naval capability in the late 18th century, Congress established the Department of the 
Navy.  Keskel points to this act, the creation of separate military departments with 
Presidential-appointed, cabinet-level, positions to oversee different functional military 
operations, as the birth of service parochialism (Keskel, 2002).   
After the American Civil War, President Grant made an ill-fated attempt at re-
organizing the War and Navy Departments.  As a war fighter, Grant recognizing the need 
for clarity of command, and proposed legislation to provide such.  Politically, the idea 
was not salient and little change resulted (Leffler & Ward, 1992).   
The outcome of the Spanish-American War was marred by the inability of the 
Army and Navy to work together.  In response, President McKinley appointed a 
commission to investigate the root causes.  The commission recommended the creation of 
the general staff of the Army and the Navy.  However, these staffs proved to be largely 
ineffective because neither had the power to influence the efforts of the other.  
Nevertheless, this structure remained in place for nearly 50 years (Leffler & Ward, 1992).   
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In reflection upon the fateful events of December 7, 1941, President Truman 
remarked:  
The tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which 
provided for no unified military command, either in the field or in Washington, as 
it was any personal failure of the Army or Navy commander.  (Truman, 1956: 46)  
 
Though ultimately successful, America’s efforts in World War II were severally 
hampered by combat operations in two major theaters, led by strong military leaders in 
both services, competing for scarce resources.  As the war progressed, the friction created 
by competition for resources under a disjointed command structure mounted.  This 
friction was especially strong in the Pacific Theater under the leadership of General 
Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz (Leffler & Ward, 1992).  Their inter-
service competition threatened to undermine the entire war effort.  President Truman 
noted: 
We must never fight another war the way that we fought the last two. I have the 
feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought 
each other, the war would have ended much earlier.  (Congressional Research 
Services, 2013: 3) 
 
Eventually, a unified command structure emerged in the European Theater under 
the command of General Eisenhower.  However, no such unity was ever achieved in the 
Pacific (Leffler & Ward, 1992).  At the close of the war, in an attempt to formalize 
command structures in future wars, President Truman argued for the creation of a unified 
defense department, citing excessive military spending and inter-service rivalry (Hogan, 
2000).  The concept of “unity of command,” was adopted under the Outline Command 
Plan of 1946 (Congressional Research Services, 2013).  This plan outlined seven separate 
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and distinct geographic commands and was the framework for the DoD’s current UCP.  
The next year, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947.   
National Security Act of 1947 
Signed into law on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 contained 
sweeping defense reform.  The major impacts of the act were the creation of:   the 
National Military Establishment (NME); the U.S. Air Force as a separate, but equal, 
military service; the Department of The Air Force as a separate, but equal, military 
department; the office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); and the Unified 
Combatant Command (UCC) structure.  The UCC essentially established a single 
commander who would have direct command authority over all forces (land, sea, or air) 
assigned to his theater under a unified command (CRS, 2013).  These unified commands 
would be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) subject to approval by the 
President and the Secretary of Defense.    
The National Security Act of 1947 gave legal standing for the Secretary of 
Defense to command and the JCS to conduct joint strategic planning for all U.S. military 
forces.  At the urging of the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, the act was amended in 1949 
to solidify the subordination of all services to the NME (Quinn, 1993).  To emphasize 
this point, the amendment changed the name of the NME to the DoD, emphasizing the 
department’s executive power.   A contributing factor to these amendments was the Key 
West and Newport Agreements of 1948.  The Newport Agreement clarified the term 
“primary mission,” which in later years was used to delineate the different functions of 
each military service (Eilon & Lyon, 2010).  The Key West Agreement, among other 
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things, attempted to resolve the debate over the responsibilities of each service (Keskel, 
2002).  The agreements ended in further compromise with results that were: 
…ambiguous in service roles, and redundancy in service functions, which build 
higher costs into the very heart of the US defense establishment. (Blechman, 
1993: np) 
 
Collectively, the Key West and Newport Agreements, along with the 1949 
amendments to the National Security Act provided the backbone for DoDD 5100.1 (Eilon 
& Lyon, 2010).  The evolution of DoDD 5100.1 (now DoDD 5100.01) coincides with 
major reorganization efforts of the DoD as depicted in Figure 2.  Historical Changes to 
DoDD 5100.1. 
 
Figure 2.  Historical Changes to DODD 5100.1 (Eilon & Lyon, 2010:32) 
 
 Following the Korean War, President Eisenhower pushed for further reform of the 
DoD structure under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.  The President articulated 
the need for a more unified and streamlined chain of command and the need to 
completely unite air, sea, and land combat forces.  The means by which President 
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Eisenhower sought to accomplish such reform was by moving the JCS out from 
underneath the Secretary of Defense in the operational chain of command and thorough 
the establishment of unified or specified commands that were assigned specific functional 
missions (Congressional Research Services, 2013).  These two objectives were 
synchronous:   
Commanders of both the unified and specified commands now took their orders 
directly on the authority of the President or the Secretary, and the CINCs were 
delegated full 'operational command' over forces assigned to them. (Quinn, 1993: 
72) 
  
 In the years following the Vietnam War, three incidents shaped the need for 
further defense organization reform:  Desert One—the failed rescue of Iranian hostage by 
U.S. Special Forces in 1980, the bombing of the Marine battalion headquarters building 
in Lebanon of 1983, and the problem-riddled invasion of Grenada, also in 1983 (Quinn, 
1993).  Collectively, these events highlighted the awkward and divided command 
arrangements created through undue parochial service interests.  Each of these incidents 
seemed to result from a failure of joint command and control, from the overly balanced 
apportionment of missions between services, or from a refusal by the services to 
cooperate with one another within that chain (Quinn, 1993).  According to a staff report 
by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985, the causal factors of these events were 
summarized as such:  
Unity of command and the assignment of appropriately-skilled personnel to the 
mission - and thus its chances for success - were perceived to have been sacrificed 
in order to satisfy parochial service considerations. (Defense Organization, 1985: 
86) 
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Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
 
Defense organizational reform came in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986.  The act sought to bring about a renewed emphasis on “jointness” in Congress and 
within the DoD.  According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations, James R. Locher III, the act sought to resolve nine major problems plaguing 
the DoD (Locher, 2001).   
First, there existed an imbalance between service and joint interests.  Supported 
by their respective JCS, the services yielded a great degree of power over the unified 
commanders they were supposed to be supporting.  Then Chairman of the JCS, General 
David Jones, assembled a Chairman’s Special Study Group on this issue.  The group’s 
findings included: 
The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of service independence is 
healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the 
services too much, and the larger needs of the nation’s defense too little.  
(Chairman’s Special Study Group, 1982: 54) 
 
Second, the JCS was not providing political leaders with the advisement they 
required.  Inter-service rivalry slowed or halted progress on key issues brought before the 
JCS.  When common ground could be found on such issues, the compromised solution 
often diminished the value of information provided.   Prior SECDEF, James Schlesinger, 
offered a scathing criticism of the ineffectiveness of the JCS during this time period: 
The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always 
disregarded.  (Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1983: 187) 
 
Third, joint-duty was viewed as a career-killing assignment by many military 
officers.  Overbearing military services often kept very close tabs on “their” officers 
assigned to joint staff assignments, limiting their effectiveness to operate under a joint 
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purview.   These officers were often more concerned with their exit strategy from the 
joint staff then the job they were placed there to accomplish.   
Fourth, operational chains of commands were confused and cumbersome.  
Although the JCS did not fall within the operational chain of command (since the 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958) they often acted as if they did, adding undue and 
unnecessary influence to the unified command process.  Further, unified commanders 
often faced what they called “the wall of the component,” where individual services held 
the reigns of their forces assigned to unified commanders, essentially limiting the 
effectiveness of those forces to carry out their missions.  Political scientist Samuel 
Huntington observed: 
Each service continues to exercise great autonomy. …  Unified commands are not 
really commands, and they certainly aren’t unified.  (Hunington, 1984: 24) 
 
Fifth, strategic planning at the Pentagon was largely ineffective.  With so much 
attention focused on infighting between the JCS, unified commanders, and services, little 
time or attention was left for long-range planning. 
Sixth, numerous DoD-level agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had been created since the 1940s.  
These agencies were designed to provide common support to all DoD components.  
However, the agencies lacked the mechanisms and oversight required to control them and 
effectively utilize their available resources.       
Seventh, although the National Security Act of 1947 specified the role of the 
SECDEF, the role of the service secretaries had never been clearly defined.  Often 
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viewed as a politically sensitive topic, the relationship between the SECDEF and the 
service secretaries was largely unspecified.   
Eighth, unnecessary duplication plagued the military department headquarters.  
With separate staffs for the secretary and the service chief, each service was burdened 
with redundancy.   
Finally, there was at this time a problem with congressional micromanagement.  
Perhaps, acting out of necessity because of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the 
DoD to coordinate its internal actions, Congress found itself making tactical level 
decisions that should have been made by the services.  Senator Samuel Nunn, one of the 
driving forces behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act commented: 
Last year [1984], Congress changed the number of smoke grenade launchers and 
muzzle boresights the Army requested. We directed the Navy to pare back its 
request for parachute flares, practice bombs, and passenger vehicles. Congress 
specified that the Air Force should cut its request for garbage trucks, street 
cleaners, and scoop loaders. This is a bit ridiculous.  (Congress, Senate, Senator 
Nunn, 1985: 25350-4)  
 
Signed into law on October 1, 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act enacted sweeping 
changes across the DoD.  According to Lindsay Eilon and Jack Lyon, authors of an OSD 
white paper on the evolution of DoDD 5100.1, the changes fell into three broad 
categories:   
Empowered the CJCS—The Chairman became the principal military advisor to 
the President and Secretary of Defense. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Joint Staff were also placed under the Chairman’s exclusive 
direction, and the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 
created. This considerably reduced the role and influence of the Service Chiefs. 
(Eilon & Lyon, 2010: 20) 
 
Empowered the Combatant Commands/ Commanders—Functions previously held 
by the Military Services were transferred to them.  (Eilon & Lyon, 2010: 20) 
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Increased and improved jointness and efficiency among the Services—  
The U.S. Military has been coordinating joint actions for centuries…the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to legislatively solidify and improve upon the most 
successful practices for the conduct of joint operations in the future. (Eilon & 
Lyon, 2010: 20, 23) 
 
 Present 
In the years following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the US military 
continues to struggle with merging operational forces from different services into a 
coherent joint force.  Perhaps the most striking example of the lack of service 
interoperability was the shooting down of an Army Blackhawk helicopter by a US Air 
Force F-15 during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1994 (Keskel, 2002).   
Despite tragic events like the fratricide of 1994, defense organizational reform has made 
little progress in the past two decades.   
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attempted to introduce reorganizational 
measures on the heels of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 
 
Secretary Rumsfeld did make a valiant effort at transformation. On September 10, 
2001, he laid out a major initiative to restructure the military. He announced an 
effort to reduce headquarters staff by 15 percent and rid the Pentagon of 
overlapping bureaucracy that he said was a serious threat, to the security of the 
United States of America.  Ironically, the very next day, on 11 September 2001, 
terrorists attacked America by hijacking commercial airliners and crashing them 
into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Suddenly, all the bickering and 
debates vanished, and the nation was united in a new war on terrorism. (Keskel, 
2002: viii) 
 
 Although organizational reform took a back seat to the Global War on Terrorism 
in the days, weeks, and months following 11 September 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld 
understood the critical importance of restructuring the DoD when he commented in a 
memorandum dated 17 September 2002 that: 
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 The war on terrorism does not supplant the need to transform the DOD; instead, 
we must accelerate our organizational, operational, business, and process reforms. 
(Rumsfeld, 2002: np)  
 
 As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan waged on for the next decade, 
defense reorganization received little attention.  However, in the past two years the US 
has withdrawn from Iraq and is planning the complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
The DoD now faces force reductions commensurate with its reduced overseas 
commitment.  As the US attempts to reduce its fiscal footprint while still maintaining a 
capable force, reorganization of the DoD is worthy of consideration.  The following 
section evaluates existing and proposed unified force structure models that may serve as a 
jumping off point for DoD reorganization.    
 
Unified Force Structure Models 
 
 Existing National Models – Canada 
 
In 1968 Canada moved to a unified military construct to resolve overlapping 
functionality issues at the strategic level (Milberry, 1984).  Under this construct, military 
components are functionally delineated under a unified command structure (Figure 3, 
Canadian Unified Command Structure).   
 In his Army War College paper on the topic, Lieutenant Colonel George Boucher 
states that Canada was the first major power to reform its military under a total 
unification organizational structure (Boucher, 1975).  Unification, in this case, involved 
both the integration and merger of the three services and their activities.  In 1963, a Royal 
Commission noted the triplication of efforts between the Army, Navy, and Air Force in 
areas such as recruiting, information, finance, and intelligence.  The redundancy, along 
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with a modern reliance on joint operations and unseemly rivalries between services, 
provided the impetus for reform.  The emphasis of the reform was on cost savings.  As 
Canada’s all-volunteer force matured and career opportunities increased, personnel costs 
increased to the highest per capita in the world (Boucher, 1975).  These manpower costs 
cut into funds previously dedicated to modernization of equipment, reducing military 
operational capability.  Canada was at a tipping point and military service unification 
seemed to be the means by which to balance the fiscal scales.  As Canadian Minister of 
National Defense, Paul Hellyer, argued: 
Either the defense budget had to be substantially increased or substantial cost 
reductions had to be made. Otherwise, funds would simply not be available for 
the capital expenditures that are essential to effective military forces.  (Hellyer, 
1966: 10) 
 
 In addition to fiscal savings, when presenting the merits of the then-proposed 
restructure, Hellyer also stated: 
 The amalgamation...will provide the flexibility to enable Canada to meet in the 
most effective manner the military requirements of the future.  It will also 
establish Canada as an unquestionable leader in the field of military organization. 
(Milberry, 1984: 367)   
 
 
 
23 
 
 
Figure 3.  Canadian Unified Military Structure (National Defence) 
 
Boucher concludes his paper by examining the feasibility of the US adopting a 
unified military organizational structure similar to Canada’s.  While many of the motives 
behind unification are salient in the US, namely the need to reduce fiscal expenditures 
and functional redundancy, Boucher points to several reasons why the adoption of the 
Canadian model may not be feasible.  First, in 1975, the size of the Canadian military 
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was only 3% of the US military.  Extrapolating the same methodology to a much larger 
force may be unachievable.  Second, different political environments may be prohibitive.  
Canadian legislators in the early 1960s were open to the integration and merger of forces.  
Similar legislation in the US has been met with criticism.  The US, by in large, is content 
with the existing military services structure and does not want to entertain the idea of 
merging services.  Instead, any unification efforts to date have occurred through an 
overarching joint staff structure to integrate actions between the firmly-rooted services.  
Finally, the adversarial service parochial environment of the US military is a reflection of 
American culture.  In much the same way that it takes two lawyers to settle an argument 
in a courtroom, it takes disagreement between more than one service chief to reach 
correct military decisions (Boucher, 1975).     
Singapore 
Unlike Canada, Singapore established a unified military structure from the outset 
upon declaring independence from Britain in 1965 (Singapore MINDEF).  Figure 4, 
Structure of the Singapore Armed Forces, delineates this structure.  While visually 
similar to the US DoD organizational chart, the difference lies in the role of the services.  
All air functions belong to the Air Force, all land functions belong to the Army, all sea 
functions belong to the Navy.  Functional areas are clearly defined and everyone works 
for a single Chief of Defence Force, not their respective service chief.  The result is a 
military that has been described as “one of the best forces in Southeast Asia, well-trained 
and well-armed.” (Keegan, 1983: 520)   
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Figure 4.  Structure of the Singapore Armed Forces (Singapore MINDEF) 
Britain 
Former Leader of Britain’s Labor Party, Denis Healy, aptly described military 
organizational reform in his country when he wrote that: 
Trying to change the British Defence bureaucracy is as difficult as trying to 
perform an appendix operation on a man while he is carrying a grand piano 
upstairs. (Seib, 1984: np) 
 
Despite the arduous challenge, Britain was able to accomplish sweeping defense 
reform as it reorganized its military structure in the 1980s.  Spurred by public outcry over 
growing defense budgets, an overwhelming need for “jointness,” and streamlined policy 
making efforts, a Ministry of Defence Organizational Review was convened in 1984.  
The review articulated the reality that every modern day military operation is conducted 
jointly; therefore, the military should be organized in such a way as to reflect this reality 
(Pagan, 2003).  The review recommended the elimination of its service ministers (akin to 
US service secretaries) and other senior posts and the formation of a combined Ministry 
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of State Staff.  Although Britain retained separate services, each with its own identity, the 
power and influence of the services were significantly diminished as compared to the 
power and influence of the US services.   
In the closing paragraphs of his US Army War College paper, Colonel Hector 
Pagan acknowledges the difficulty in extrapolating the British experience to the current 
US military organizational structure.  The number of personnel, missions, equipment, and 
infrastructure of the US military makes it a unique entity.   
 
 Proposed Models for the DoD 
 
In his Air War College paper entitled, Doing Things That Can’t Be Done:  
Creating an New Defense Establishment, Colonel Kenneth Keskel highlights several 
flaws to the current DoD organizational structure before proposing an alternative 
structure.   
According to Keskel, the current DoD structure harbors three primary defects:   
 
First, the organization bureaucracy has grown so large that it has become 
inefficient. Second, service parochialism has grown from a positive motivator to 
an Achilles’ heel, creating duplication of effort and misguided priorities. Third, it 
is ill equipped to respond to the growing need to work with joint, interagency, and 
coalition partners.  (Keskel, 2002: 3) 
 
To address these defects, Keskel argues for an organizational structure that 
supports emerging missions, is within fiscal constraints, and improves “jointness” to 
accomplish objectives in accordance with national security guidance.   
To accomplish these objectives, he suggests delineating the “tooth” from the 
“tail” of the services.  The “tooth” refers to the core warfighting competencies of the 
services.  Colonel Keskel argues that these functions should be functionally re-aligned 
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among smaller, more flexible corps (Air Corps, Naval Corps, Army Corps, etc.).  The 
“tail” refers to the support forces that sustain the services’ teeth.  He suggests these 
functions should be consolidated under a joint support force (Figure 5.  Keskel’s 
Proposed DoD Restructure).  Keskel proposes six steps towards a reorganized DoD: 
(1) Step One: Streamline overhead. Eliminate the three service secretary staffs and 
transfer their functions up to OSD and realign down to the military departments.  
 
(2) Step Two: Reduce layers. Transition and consolidate service-specific three-star 
level commands into standing joint task forces.  
 
(3) Step Three: Change mindset. Establish a joint promotion system.  
 
(4) Step Four: Reduce duplication. Consolidate the numerous defense and service 
support agencies performing similar functions into single agencies.  
 
(5) Step Five: Increase flexibility. Transform the current military departments that 
contain both “tooth” and “tail” to smaller, more flexible “corps” focused on core 
competencies (tooth), and establish a joint support force (tail) to augment these 
warfighting corps.  
 
(6) Step Six: Adapt concepts. Modify the combatant command concept to better meet 
the future spectrum of conflict. (Keskel, 2002: 35-36) 
 
Keskel estimates four primary benefits of implementing such a structure.  First, 
the corps would be able to focus, exclusively, on their core competencies.  Second, 
functional duplication between services would be greatly reduced.  Third, this structure 
offers much greater flexibility to the combatant commander.   Finally, interoperability 
between forces and operating systems would be greatly enhanced.   
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Figure 5.  Keskel’s Proposed DoD Restructure (Keskel, 2002) 
 
Colonel Leonard Kaplan proposes another alternative organizational structure for 
the DoD in his paper, A Single Unified U.S. Military—A Modest Proposal.  Kaplan 
suggests the elimination of services and their staffs.  He argues that the job of organizing, 
training, and equipping forces should fall to the combatant commander since they will be 
the ones to employ those forces in combat.  Each combatant command would have air, 
land, sea, and special operations forces assigned and functionally partitioned.   
Under Kaplan’s proposed structure, he argues for a greater role of DoD-level 
defense agencies.  Each agency currently provides a functional service to the DoD.  By 
allowing the Defense Intelligence Agency to coordinate all intelligence functions, the 
Defense Logistics Agency to coordinate all logistics operations, the Defense Information 
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Systems Agency to coordinate all communication actions, etc. the DoD will significantly 
streamline its operations.   
The benefits of such a structure are summarized by the author: 
The entire process would be streamlined since the CINCs would have the 
predominant input into satisfying their warfighting needs currently and in the 
future. The coordination needed for decisions would be reduced, there would be 
much less parochialism and in-fighting, and the planning, programming, and 
budgeting system would be streamlined. Efficiency should be greatly improved.  
(Kaplan, 1993: 15) 
 
Kaplan ends his paper by presenting several arguments against a unified military 
structure.  The first argument raised is one of tradition.  The Army and Navy have 
histories dating back over two hundred years.  The culture of the services is firmly rooted 
in the DoD, veterans organizations, and the American public.  Second, Kaplan points out 
that just as iron sharpens iron, so may service in-fighting enhance our military strength.  
The US Government is built upon checks and balances.  Since the US Military is a 
reflection of the government it serves, should not checks and balances exist with the DoD 
as well?  Finally, Kaplan gives consideration to the potential concern of vesting too much 
power in any one general.  Under a unified command structure, one general would have 
authority over the entire DoD and its forces.  This general would still serve under the 
control of civilian leadership, but the potential for a rogue general increase under a 
unified structure.   
In his Naval Postgraduate School paper, Toward a New Strategic Framework:  A 
Unified Command Plan for the New World Order, Captain John Quinn proposes another 
alternative to the current DoD organizational structure.  Quinn’s research is focused on 
the Unified Command Plan (UCP), its roots and evolution, and the impact of service in-
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fighting on how we execute warfare today.  To counter the influence of the services, 
Quinn proposes a completely restructured hierarchical UCP framework.    
 Quinn cites Samuel Huntington’s view of organization of command (Huntington, 
1984).  Huntington calls for the establishment of: 
 Mission commands, not area commands.  The current structure of unified and 
specified commands thus often tends to unify things that should not be unified 
and to divide things that should be under single command.  (Huntington, 1984: 
251) 
 
 In keeping with this philosophy, Quinn articulates the need for a UCP framework 
by which to overcome inter-service problems and ensure the combat effectiveness of 
forces: 
 To ensure success at the outset of hostilities requires a complete restructuring that 
starts from the top - the structure of the Unified Command Plan - and builds down 
with a conscious goal of meeting the operational needs of the CinC and limiting 
(or eliminating) the deleterious impact of the service components on joint war 
fighting.  (Quinn, 1993: 120-121) 
 
Specifically, Quinn proposes a UCP framework consisting of three Theater, two 
Area, and five Forces Commands as follows: 
(1) European Theater Command - includes projected in-theater forces in Europe 
and the Mediterranean.  
 
(2) Northeast Asia Theater Command - includes projected in-theater forces in 
Korea, Japan, and Okinawa.  
 
(3) Southwest Asia Theater Command - includes in-theater forces plus 
training/traditional relationship with either the Rapid Deployment/Contingency 
Force or the Mobilization/Reinforcing Forces Command.  
 
(4) Atlantic Area Command - includes the Atlantic Expeditionary/Early 
Reinforcing Forces Command.  
 
(5) Pacific Area Command - includes the Pacific Expeditionary/Early Reinforcing 
Forces Command. 
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(6) Rapid Deployment Forces Command - includes XVIII Corps HQ (serving as a 
JTF HQ), the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and 10th Mountain Divisions, the 
23rd Wing, and Marine Air Contingency Force units. 
 
(7) Reinforcing Forces Command - includes 'one of a kind' air units and the 
partially-manned and mobilization air, sea, and land forces that comprise the 
nation's conventional 'strategic reserve'. 
 
(8) Strategic Deterrence and Defense Forces Command (STRATCOM). 
 
(9) Strategic Transportation Forces Command (TRANSCOM). 
 
(10) Special Operations Forces Command (SOCOM).  (Quinn, 1993: 156-157) 
 
According to the author, the benefits of such a framework are threefold.  First, it 
provides theater commanders, whom are charged with executing military operations, 
greater flexibility and more forces.  Second, it delineates UCP boundaries at sea, where 
they are more easily de-conflicted.  Finally, it allows for the flexible employment of 
forces to accomplish strategic objectives. By retaining a worldwide focus, the JCS would 
be able to apportion forces where they are most needed.   
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Martignetti also proposes revision to the UCP in his 
Army Command and General Staff College paper entitled, Déjà vu:  The Unified 
Command Plan of the Future Revisited.  Martignetti argues for a complete revision of the 
UCP based on functional missions versus the current regional construct.   
According to Martignetti, the role of the UCP is to align available military 
resources to tasks requisite to accomplish the NSS and NMS.  He argues that the existing 
UCP is not structured to ensure efficient operations across the entire national security 
establishment.  Due to cultural, philosophical, doctrinal, and organizational differences 
between services and other government agencies, Martignetti argues that the traditional 
military structure is neither efficient nor effective as it could be at meeting NSS 
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objectives.  Instead, the author argues for the dissolution of geographic commands and 
replacing them with functional commands that can better integrate with other USG 
Departments to provide a truly joint national response to any number of scenarios.   
Martignetti summarizes the impetus for his proposed revision to the UCP as follows: 
To be more efficient and effective, it is not only appropriate for the UCP to shift 
from a regional focus to a functional focus, but it would be more appropriate for 
the entire national security structure to align each of the elements of national 
power within similar structures, thereby fostering cooperation and engagement.  
(Martignetti, 2010: 38) 
 
Martignetti states that terrorism, natural disasters, weapons of mass destruction, 
space, information, and communications have no borders and therefore neither should our 
military commands (Martignetti, 2010).  The author argues for the creation of four 
additional functional commands to complement the three functional combatant 
commands currently in existence.   
The first is the Homeland Defense Command (USHDCOM).  This command 
would focus on the defense of the US homeland and would coordinate closely with the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard.  The second is the Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief Command (USHADRCOM).  This command would work 
closely with USG and non-governmental disaster-relief agencies.  The third is the 
Security and Stability (USSSCOM).  This command would work with the US State 
Department to provide security, stability, and reconstruction efforts globally.  The fourth 
is the War Command (USWARCOM).  This command would be responsible to train for 
and execute the US’ major combat operations (Martignetti, 2010).   
Under Martignetti’s proposal, the Joint Staff and services’ structure and purpose 
would remain intact.  The Joint Staff would focus on future conflict, required legislation, 
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and exercises.  The services would organize, train, and equip forces for the seven 
functional combatant commanders.  Once partitioned, forces assigned to combatant 
commanders would be assigned to a rapidly deployable Joint Task Force (JTF) cell from 
the respective functional command.   
 If implemented, Martignetti estimates two major benefits of a revised UCP.  First, 
combatant commanders who are charged with executing military and humanitarian 
operations will have greater flexibility, will be more responsive, and will have more 
forces available to them.  Second, as boundaries between commands disappear, cross-talk 
amongst commands should increase.   
 A final proposed model for consideration is presented by Colonel Hector Pagan in 
his US Army War College paper, Defense Reorganization, the Road Ahead for the 21st 
Century.  Pagan proposes eliminating the different service secretariat positions, 
consolidating civilian control of the military under the SECDEF, and distributing tasks 
appropriately across DoD and between the services (Pagan, 2003).   
 Pagan expresses that all large organizations, the DoD included, consumes 
resources and talent, both military and civilian.  He argues that the more layers of 
leadership in an organization, the more insulated senior leadership is from the real issues.  
This slows down actions and increases micro-management.  Pagan looks to the successful 
reform of the British military in the 1980s as contextual proof of concept for his proposal 
to reduce layers of DoD leadership.  He argues that: 
Elimination of the service secretariats could yield almost immediate savings in 
manpower and resources, which could easily be applied to operational units and 
combatant commands worldwide. DOD needs to find redundancy, eliminate it, or 
determine if those functions could be better served in the JCS or SECDEF staffs.  
(Pagan, 2003: 12) 
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If any of the aforementioned existing or proposed models is to be implemented by 
the DoD, it would constitute a major reengineering effort.  The following section 
provides an overview of the concept of Business Process Reengineering (BPR), context 
as BPR relates to the DoD, and an appraisal of quantitative measurement techniques for 
assessing the expected results of reengineering efforts.   
 
Organizational Business Process Reengineering 
 
 BPR Overview 
 
 In their flagship book on the topic, Reengineering the Corporation:  A Manifesto 
for Business Revolution, Michael Hammer and James Champy champion BPR and the 
potential benefits organizations stand to reap from successful reengineering efforts 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993).  At its core: 
 Reengineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures 
of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed.  (Hammer & Champy, 
1993: 35) 
 
 The key words in this definition are fundamental, radical, processes, and 
dramatic.  Understanding each of these terms is important to the discussion at hand.  In 
order for changes in an organization to be fundamentally different, they must be radical.  
Hammer states that: 
 At the heart of reengineering is the notion of discontinuous thinking – of 
recognizing and breaking away from the outdated rules and fundamental 
assumptions that underlie operations.  Unless we change the rules, we are merely 
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.  We cannot achieve breakthroughs in 
performance by cutting fat or automating existing processes.  Rather, we must 
challenge old assumptions and shed the old rules that made the business 
underperform in the first place.  (Hammer, 1990: 107) 
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 The medium by which fundamental, radical change occurs is processes.  Hammer 
& Champy define processes as: 
 A collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of input and creates an 
output that is of value to the customer.  (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 38) 
 
 Implied in this definition is knowledge of who the customer is, and what they 
value.  The means by which value is assessed under BPR is through dramatic 
improvements to contemporary performance measures such as cost, quality, service, and 
speed.  According to Hammer’s research, 40 percent decreases in costs, 40 percent 
increases in quality and customer satisfaction, and 70 percent decreases in cycle time are 
realistic goals for effective BPR efforts (Hammer, 1990).  However, in order to realize 
these improvements, organizations must take a holistic approach to reengineering.      
 Reengineering triggers changes of many kinds, not just of the business process 
itself.  Job designs, organizational structures, management systems – anything 
associated with the process – must be refashioned in an integrated way.  In other 
words, reengineering is a tremendous effort that mandates change in many areas 
of the organization. (Hammer, 1990: 112) 
 
 The next section relates the concepts of BPR to the DoD structure and in so doing, 
provide a contextual framework by which to address the problem statement of this 
research.     
 
 BPR and the DoD 
 
 The DoD is one of the largest organization in the world with some 2.2 million 
active duty and civilian employees. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013)  Reengineering 
an organization the size of DoD seems an insurmountable task. However, current fiscal 
realities may push the DoD to accomplish fundamental, radical changes to its processes 
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in an attempt to realize dramatic cost savings.  The challenge is immense because as 
former Chairman of the JCS  General George Jones once wrote, there are:   
…two pervasive problems within DoD. First, we are too comfortable with the 
past. Second, we do not make a sufficiently rigorous examination of defense 
requirements and alternatives. By their very nature, large organizations have a 
built-in resistance to change. As the largest organization in the free world, our 
defense establishment has most of the problems of a large corporation but lacks 
an easily calculated “bottom line” to force needed change. (Jones, 1996: 23) 
 
Jones further added that: 
 
Bureaucratic resistance to change is enormous and is reinforced by many allies of 
the services—in Congress and elsewhere—who are bent on keeping the past 
enthroned. (Jones, 1996: 27) 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel David Fautua, USA (Ret.), described the DoD’s resistance to 
change in the context of joint operations when he wrote: 
That the idea of joint culture is a seemingly self-contradictory proposition to the 
ambitions of a self-professed joint military remains a puzzling paradox. Equally 
astonishing is how the term has survived as an expression of a possible truth even 
as proponents for “jointness” decry initiatives that might actually draw the 
services closer or recoil at the slightest suggestion of delimiting service cultures. 
(Fautua, 2000: 86) 
  
 To accomplish reengineering within the DoD, consideration must be given to the 
basic precepts of BPR as they relate to the DoD.  These precepts are customers and 
processes.   
 Understanding who the customers of an organization are shapes the organization’s 
reengineering efforts to satisfy the needs of those customers.  For military services, 
customers include the American people, elected civilian leaders, and combatant 
commanders.  American taxpayers and civilian leaders value a low cost to sustain quality 
military services.  From an operational perspective, combatant commanders utilize the 
forces provided by the services to accomplish objectives in accordance with the NSS and 
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NMS.  These combatant commanders value quality, service, and speed from the forces 
provided them from the military services.     
 Combatant commanders are primarily concerned with processes (positioning 
forces, striking targets, resupplying bases, etc.).  Military services are primarily focused 
on the functions they perform as described in DoDD 5100.01.  Because military services 
are first and foremost focused on their own functions, which are not necessarily in tune 
with the processes that their customers (combatant commanders) expect, there is 
inherently discord.  The result is service parochialism, redundant functionality between 
services, and a lack of fit between missions in the DoD.  To truly reengineer, the DoD 
must take a congruent, process-focused view.  This view should focus on the efficient 
organization of inputs (services) to maximize outputs (processes) to combatant 
commanders at the minimum cost (to satisfy the American people and elected civilian 
leaders).  A primary step towards this end is reorganizing the DoD under a unified 
structure that, having stripped away redundancy, is enabled to orient itself to perform the 
processes required by the customer in a cost-effective manner.  This first step, a 
monumental task in and of itself, is the focus of this research.   
 To understand the magnitude of the effort required to reengineer the DoD, it is 
helpful to look to the private sector at other “large” organizations that have successfully 
implemented reengineering initiatives.  Perhaps the largest company to successfully 
reengineer their business operations was International Business Machines Corporation 
(IBM) in the early 1990s.  In his reflective account of reengineering efforts, Who Says 
Elephants Can’t Dance, previous IBM CEO Louis Gerstner recounts some of the major 
issues he and his team of “IBMers” overcame (Gerstner, 2002).   
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 In the late 1980s IBM was the undisputed worldwide leader in computer 
processing technology.  Employing over 300,000 employees in 160 countries with a net 
worth of over $65 Billion USD, the IBM of the late 1980s certainly qualifies as a large 
corporation (Gerstner, 2002).  Despite its size and large market share, especially in 
mainframe computing, IBM was not immune to hardship.  In the early 1990s, IBM began 
losing market shares to upstart competitors like Microsoft, Oracle, and Sun 
Microsystems.  Realizing that the company was losing billions of dollars each quarter, 
the board of directors sought new leadership that could right the IBM ship.  Louis 
Gerstner was appointed CEO of IBM in April 1993.  Gerstner immediately recognized 
that many of IBMS business processes were cumbersome and very expensive.  In 
response, Gerstner led the decade-long charge to completely reengineer IBMs main 
business processes. 
 Gerstner understood that reengineering would not be easy, but he also understood 
it to be essential if he was to save IBM.  One of Gerstner’s senior executives aptly 
commented that: 
 Reengineering is like starting a fire on your head and putting it out with a 
hammer.  (Gerstner, 2002: 64) 
  
 Gerstner further defined the problems at IBM: 
 We were bloated.  We were inefficient.  We had piled redundancy on top of 
redundancy.  We were running inventory systems, accounting systems, fulfillment 
systems, and distribution systems that were all, to a greater or lesser degree, the 
mutant offspring of systems built in the early mainframe days and then adapted 
and patched together to fit the needs of one of twenty-four independent business 
units.  … The result was the business equivalent of the railroad systems of the 
nineteenth century—different tracks, different gauges, different specifications for 
the rolling stock.  If we had a financial issue that required the cooperation of 
several business units to resolve, we had no common way of talking about it 
because we were maintaining 266 different ledger systems.  (Gerstner, 2002: 64) 
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 Understanding the depth and breadth of IBM’s problems, Gerstner made the 
decision to reengineer IBMs core business processes concurrently versus sequentially.  
These core processes included hardware development, software development, order 
fulfillment, integrated supply chain, customer relationship management, and services.  
Each of these core processes were composed of many lesser internal processes.  In total, 
Gerstner and his team embarked on 60 major reengineering projects throughout the 1990s 
(Gerstner, 2002).  The results of IBM’s reengineering efforts amounted to $14 Billion 
USD in overall savings, $15 Billion USD in avoided materials costs, a 65 percent 
improvement in on time delivery rates, a reduction of $80 Million USD in inventory 
carrying costs, and the reduction of delivery costs by $270 Million USD (Gerstner, 2002).   
IBM’s success with reengineering, while remarkable, is not unprecedented.  The 
next section highlights tools and techniques that have proven successful in reengineering 
efforts.  These tools and techniques may also be used as guideposts by which to organize 
reengineer initiatives.   
 
Assessing the Effectiveness of BPR 
 
For organizations that have successfully accomplished reengineering, it is 
relatively simple to assess the effectiveness of BPR.  Those organizations need only 
compare the cost, quality, service, and speed pre- and post-reengineering.  For 
organizations considering reengineering, the assessment is much more difficult.  
Estimating improvements in cost, quality, service, and speed of proposed changes is an 
arduous task.  In their literature review of BPR, Peter O’Neill and Amrik Sohal highlight 
five tools and techniques by which organizations might accomplish BPR (O’Neill & 
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Sohal, 1999).  Consideration of how these tools and techniques effect change in an 
organization may prove useful in estimating the extent of those changes.     
The first BPR tool/technique is process visualization.  Many authors argue that a 
clearly defined end state is essential before reengineering begins (O’Neill & Sohal, 
1999).  Still others argue for a clear vision of the entire process, not just the desired end 
state.  (Barrett, 1994).   
A second BPR tool/technique is process mapping/operational method study.  The 
Integrated Data Method, Data Flow Diagrams, Object Oriented Analysis, and Process 
Based Project Management are examples of this tool/technique (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999). 
A third BPR tool/technique is change management.  This approach takes into 
account the human side of reengineering by focusing on the management of 
organizational change (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999).  Humans often perceive change as a 
major threat to themselves or their jobs.  Therefore, some authors argue that change 
management is perhaps the most important task in reengineering (Mumford & Geert, 
1994).   
A fourth BPR tool/technique is benchmarking.  Several authors propose that 
benchmarking is an integral part of BPR as it allows for the visualization and process 
development  of processes that exist in like organizations (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999).       
The fifth and final BPR tool/technique according to O’Neill & Sohal is process 
and customer focus.  As previously mentioned, reengineering must be focused on the 
processes that satisfy the needs of its customers.   
  Hammer & Champy close their book with a synopsis of ways to succeed at BPR 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993).  It is worth considering four of these points in closing this 
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section.  Knowing common pitfalls and how to avoid them is important when chartering 
reengineering initiatives.   
First, organizations must change processes instead of attempting to fix them.  If a 
process is truly broken, it must be reengineered, it should not be “fixed” through 
patchwork improvements in the form of automation, downsizing, and motivational 
programs.  The tendency is to attempt to improve outcomes while keeping existing 
organizational structures and dysfunctional processes instead of starting from scratch to 
restructure the organization and develop processes to focus on meeting customer needs.  
Hammer & Champy state that only processes can be reengineered, not organizational 
units.  They also state: 
Incrementalism is the path of least resistance for most organizations.  It is also the 
surest way to fail at reengineering.  (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 223) 
 
Second, organizations must not quit their reengineering efforts too early.  Many 
companies abandon reengineering initiatives at the first sign of trouble to return to the 
comfort of preexisting processes.  Still other companies quit after initial reengineering 
success. Satisfied with minor improvements, these companies forfeit the huge payoffs 
awaiting firms that successfully reengineer (Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
Third, reengineering efforts should not be dragged out.  Once an organization’s 
leadership decides to reengineer its processes, change should come quickly.  Hammer & 
Champy argue that twelve months is time enough for an organization to move from 
announcement to tangible action.  Not all reengineering efforts will be completed in this 
first year, but there must be early evidence of success; else, employees will become 
distracted, impatient, and confused with regard to BPR (Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
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Finally, reengineering should not be attempted when the CEO is within two years 
of retirement.   Reengineering is a major muscle movement for an organization.  It 
requires a high level of enthusiasm and commitment from senior leadership.   It is 
improbable that a leader nearing the end of their career would take on such an ambitious 
undertaking.  Also, in order to succeed at reengineering, a company must remain focused 
on a clear vision of where their efforts will take them in the end.  Frequent changes in 
leadership (and therefore leadership’s vision) disrupts past reengineering 
accomplishments and threatens future reengineering success.  (Hammer & Champy, 
1993). 
 
Summary 
 
 A review of existing literature on the topic was presented in three sections.  First, 
a review of the history behind the current DoD organizational structure to include the US 
Constitution, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  
Second, an appraisal of current unified force structures in use by other countries and an 
examination of proposed models for the DoD.  Finally, a review of methodologies used to 
estimate the effectiveness of organizational reengineering.  Collectively, this literature 
review provides the predicate framework for a methodology by which a comprehensive 
fiscal analysis of the current DoD structure is presented in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 
examines the results of the analysis as they relate to the three IQs.  Finally, Chapter 5 
discusses analysis of the results, to include recommendations for future research and use 
within the DoD.   
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III. Methodology 
Overview 
 
This chapter describes, in seven sections, the methodology used to assess the 
potential impact of the DoD transitioning to a functionally-aligned, unified organizational 
structure.  The first section discusses benchmarking in detail.  The second section 
outlines the proposed organizational structure based on existing and proposed models 
previously described in the literature review.  The next three sections describe the 
methodology used to benchmark major functions from a fiscal perspective, between the 
four services.  First, a qualitative analysis of overlapping functions by military service 
will highlight areas of functional redundancy.  Second, a quantitative assessment of the 
size of force provided by each service enables comparison of functions between services 
in like units.  Third, a quantitative analysis of the DoD’s budget request for FY2013 
identifies requested budgeted amounts from each service to perform functional missions.   
The sixth section describes methodology for benchmarking between services.  This 
section combines data from the previous two sections, identifies the lowest budget 
requests per function by service.  This baseline per-function rate is applied as a 
benchmark to extrapolate across all services, forming a baseline fiscal savings figure over 
the current DoD structure.  The final section briefly describes methodology for content 
analysis of existing literature to assess the non-financial benefits of a unified, 
functionally-aligned DoD structure.          
Benchmarking  
Originating with Xerox in 1979, benchmarking is a powerful tool for improving 
many aspects of an organization (Abalateo & Lee, 1993).  At its core, benchmarking is: 
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 The formal process of measuring and comparing a company’s operations, 
products, and services against those of top performers both within and outside that 
company’s primary industry.  (Altany, 1991: 12).   
 
 According to Camp, the process of benchmarking consists of five phases:  
planning, analysis, integration, action, and maturity (Camp, 1989).  Altany summarizes 
these phases in a typical benchmarking scenario: 
 The process itself is so straightforward and simple.  A senior manager typically 
will start by deciding what part of the company to benchmark.  The manager then 
instructs specialists in that area to determine what company is the very best at that 
function and to start collecting data to exchange with that company.  After 
analyzing the data, a strategic plan is developed to incorporate the most effective 
approaches used by the benchmarked company.  (Altany, 1991: 11) 
 
 With a basic understanding of the process of benchmarking, it is worth examining 
a taxonomy of the different types of benchmarking.  According to D.R. Hull, former 
manager of benchmarking for AT&T, benchmarking can be divided into two types, broad 
and specific (Foster, 1992).  These categories are further divided as shown in Figure 6:   
 
Figure 6.  Levels of Benchmarking (Abalateo & Lee, 1993: 14) 
 
Broad 
- Strategic 
- Operational 
 
Specific 
- Internal 
- Generic 
- Competitive 
- Functional 
- Working-task 
- Function-wide 
- Management-process 
- Total-operation 
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 For this research, benchmarking will be applied both broadly (Strategic) and 
specifically (Function-wide).  According to Abalateo & Lee, strategic benchmarking 
deals with the long term goals of an organization.  Conversely, function-wide 
benchmarking deals with all relevant tasks in a specific function (Abalateo & Lee, 1993).  
This research considers the long term strategic goals of the DoD under the purview of a 
revised organizational structure.  Specific functions are benchmarked between services to 
potentially improve operational efficiency of the DoD.  
 
Proposed Organizational Structure 
 Examining the existing national models for defense establishments and the 
proposed organizational structures for the DoD in the literature review, a hybrid structure 
is proposed.  Taking key components from several models may yield the best option for a 
functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure.  The foundation of this hybrid 
structure is based on Keskel’s model.   
Keskel’s model proposes separating the “teeth” from the “tail” of the military of 
services.  The teeth of the services are those core functions that each service is uniquely 
positioned to accomplish (Keskel, 2002).  These functions would fall under the purview 
of the military service that is functionally designated to perform the function.  To clearly 
delineate functional areas between the services, existing services would be re-designated 
as corps, similar to the current structure of the United States Marine Corps.  All air 
functions would be re-aligned under an Air Corps, all land functions under am Army 
Corps, all maritime functions under a Naval Corps, all amphibious operations under the 
Marine Corps, all space functions under a Space Corps, and all special operations 
 
 
46 
 
functions under a Special Operations Corps.  All other functions that support these core 
missions, Keskel’s tail functions, would follow the recommendation of Kaplan and be re-
aligned under existing DoD-level defense agencies (Kaplan, 1993).  This is a departure 
from Keskel’s recommendation for the establishment of a Joint Support Force to manage 
the tail functions.   
The DoD currently operates 17 defense agencies and 10 field activities (U.S. 
Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, 2010).  Appendix 2.  DoD Defense Agencies, 
lists these agencies and activities and provides a brief description of their current 
functional mission.  These agencies and activities are uniquely suited to coordinate 
support (tail) functions across the separate military corps.  Most support functions 
described in DoDD 5100.01 fit within one of these existing agencies or activities.  In 
addition to existing defense agencies and field activities, the proposed organizational 
structure adds a Defense Medical Agency to coordinate and operate all medical functions, 
a Defense Civil Engineering Agency to coordinate and oversee maintenance and 
construction of infrastructure, and a Defense Recruiting Activity to coordinate and 
execute all recruiting actions.    
If core military functions are the responsibilities of the corps and support 
functions reside with the appropriate defense agency, there is diminished value in 
maintaining the service secretaries and their staffs.  As suggested by Pagan, the proposed 
organizational structure presented eliminates the service chiefs and their staffs, 
consolidating civilian control under the SECDEF (Pagan, 2003).   
A final change to the existing DoD organizational structure is the elimination of 
USSOCOM. With the addition of a Special Operations Corps, the need for USSOCOM is 
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diminished.  Instead, special operations forces would be organized, trained, and equipped 
by the corps and employed by the existing geographic combatant commanders.    
Depicted in Figure 7, Proposed DoD Organizational Structure, these four 
proposed changes take the form of a revised DoD organizational structure that is 
functionally-align and unified.  The next three sections describe the methodology by 
which this research seeks to assess the potential benefits of such a structure.   
 
Figure 7.  Proposed DoD Organizational Structure 
 
Qualitative Analysis of Overlapping Functions 
 As discussed in the previous two chapters, DoDD 5100.01 defines the functions 
for which each military service and department are responsible.  A synopsis of these 
functions may be found at Appendix A.  For the reader’s convenience, the major 
functions of the DoD are summarized in Table 1:   
 
SECDEF
Air Corps Naval Corps Army Corps Marine Corps Space Corps
Special 
Operations 
Corps
Joint Staff Unified Commands
Defense 
Agencies
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Table 1. Major Functions of Military Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Analyzing which service performs which of these major functions will identify 
areas of redundant functionality.  Knowing where redundancy exists between military 
services narrows the scope of this research to focus on those functional areas. The next 
Service-Specific Functions 
Land Operations 
Maritime Operations 
Air Operations 
Nuclear Operations 
Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Riverine Operations 
Space Operations 
Airborne Operations 
ISR Operations 
Civil Affairs Operations 
Aeromedical Evacuation Operations 
Establish Initial Military Government 
Civil Works Programs 
Security Operations 
Functions Common to all Military Services 
Training for Joint Operations and Joint Exercises 
Organize, Train, and Equip Forces 
Cyberspace Operations 
Special Operations 
Personnel Recovery Operations 
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Building Partnership Capacity 
Forcible Entry Operations 
Presidential Support 
Antiterrorism 
Support Civil Authorities 
Conduct Operational Testing and Evaluation 
Command and Control 
Force Protection 
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section describes the methodology utilized for quantitative assessment of the size of force 
provided by each service for each function.   
 
Quantitative Assessment of Size of Force 
 Knowing the overlap of functions provided by military services, the next step is to 
determine the size of the force associated with each function by service.  For example, 
DoDD 5100.01 states that all four services provide forces in support of air operations, the 
questions are how many and what type of forces?  There is no sole source for this data.  
Instead, size-of-force data is spread across service budget justification books, service and 
joint factsheets, Congressional Research Services (CRS) reports, and QDR reports.  A 
consolidated worksheet of data to be collected is presented in Table 2:   
 
Table 2.  Size of Force Data Worksheet 
 Size of Force (#) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel (K)     
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel (K)     
Civilian Personnel (K)     
Cadets (K)     
PCS Moves (K)     
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours (K)    
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI)    
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions     
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance     
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit     
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported     
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2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs    
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Personnel (K)    
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population (K)     
Enlisted Recruit Output (K)     
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft     
Rotary Wing Aircraft     
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft     
Strategic UAVs     
Aircraft Modifications (TAI)    
Repair/Spare Parts and Support (TAI)    
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles     
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions     
Tactical Missiles     
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars     
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained (M)     
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained    
 
 
 To facilitate data collection, the functional activities in Table 2 are divided in 
accordance with budget appropriation titles.  The DoD’s annual budget request to 
Congress is divided into seven appropriation titles:  Personnel, Operations and 
Maintenance, Procurement, Research and Development, Military Construction, Family 
Housing, and Revolving Funds.  These appropriation titles form the foundation for 
analysis from this point forward.   
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However, some of the data associated with each of these appropriation titles is not 
sufficiently complete to conduct detailed analysis as prescribed here within.  The research 
utilized three criteria to determine the feasibility of including an appropriation title, or 
subcategory, in further analysis (Figure 8, Data Inclusion Criteria).  The first criterion 
was classification.  Certain size of force data may be classified and will therefore be 
unavailable for analysis as this research is unclassified.  The second criterion was a 
common point of reference between services.  In order to analyze redundant functions 
between services, there must be a common basis for size-of-force comparison.  If no such 
basis was available, the data was excluded from analysis.  The final criterion for data 
inclusion was availability of associated budget request data for the given function.  The 
importance of this criterion is apparent in the next section, which describes the 
methodology utilized to perform quantitative analysis on the DoD’s budget request for 
FY2013.   
 
 
Figure 8. Data Inclusion Criteria 
 
Quantitative Assessment of Budget Requests 
 As previously stated in Chapter I, budget requests originate with the military 
services, are vetted by military departments, and consolidated at the DoD for submission 
to Congress.  To analyze budget requests in any detail, it is necessary to examine budget 
Criterion 1 – Data Classification 
 
Criterion 2 – Common Size-of-Force Reference Point 
 
Criterion 3 – Availability of Budget Request Data 
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requests at the service level, before they are consolidated by the DoD.  Each military 
service publishes budget request data on their respective financial management websites.  
Citations for these websites are provided with the actual data in Chapter IV.  Service 
budget requests are published under the seven appropriation titles described in the 
previous section.  These seven appropriation titles are further divided into subtitles.  
These subtitles are then further divided into BACs and budget sub-activity codes.  
Collectively, this data provides information on how much money each military service 
budgets for separate functional areas.  A consolidated worksheet of data to be collected is 
presented in Table 3:   
 
Table 3.  Budget Request Data Worksheet 
 Budget Request Amount ($Million) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M)    
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M)    
Civilian Personnel ($M)    
Cadets ($M)     
PCS Moves ($M)    
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours ($M)    
Total Aircraft Inventory ($M)   
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions ($M)     
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M)     
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M)     
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M)     
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs ($M)    
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
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$ 
Operational Efficiency = 
Unit of Function
USD
Total Cost ($M)   
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population ($M)  
Enlisted Recruit Output ($M)    
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M)     
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M)     
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M)     
Strategic UAVs ($M)   
Aircraft Modifications ($M)  
Repair/Spare Parts and Support ($M)  
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles     
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions ($M)     
Tactical Missiles ($M)     
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars ($M)     
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained ($M)     
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M)     
DEPARTMENT TOTALS    
DoD TOTAL  
 
  
Benchmarking Between Services 
 Combining data from the previous two sections, size-of-force data and budget 
request data, the research examines the operational efficiency of the services.  For this 
research, operational efficiency is measured as a rate of dollars per unit of function as 
shown in Equation 1: 
 
(1) 
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 The ‘Unit of Function’ in this equation is different for each functional area 
assessed.  It is the unit associated with size of force data in Table 2.   
  Examining operational efficiency rates for each service with redundant functional 
capability allows for comparison between services.  For any given function, one service 
may perform that function at a lower rate than the other services.  This low-cost-to-serve 
rate serves as the benchmark for the DoD for that function.  This benchmarked rate may 
then be applied across that function throughout the entire DoD.  When this methodology 
is applied to all functions within the DoD, the result is a potential fiscal savings from 
benchmarking operations between services.  Figure 9, Methodology Flow Chart, 
summarizes this methodology, utilizing table nomenclature from Chapter 4.    
In order to realize potential fiscal savings, the DoD must be organized in a 
manner conducive to implementation.  This is the link between organizational structure 
and benchmarking.  For the DoD to effectively benchmark operations between existing 
services would require an unprecedented, and improbable, level of inter-service 
coordination and the extermination of service parochialism.  Instead, a revised 
organizational structure, that is functionally-aligned to provide a unified force may 
provide a more salient framework by which to implement benchmarking initiatives and 
thereby realize meaningful fiscal savings.  
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Figure 9. Methodology Flow Chart 
 
Content Analysis of Non-Financial Benefits 
 Various scholars have authored papers that propose alterations to the current DoD 
organizational structure.  Some of these papers were reviewed under the literature review 
in the previous section.  Many of these authors articulate potential non-financial benefits 
to their espoused structure.  By performing a content analysis of these papers, searching 
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for non-financial benefits, this research presents a consolidated list of potential non-
financial benefits if the DoD were to reengineer towards a unified, functionally-aligned 
organizational structure.   
 
Summary 
This chapter described, in seven sections, the methodology used to assess the 
potential impact of the DoD transitioning to a functionally-aligned, unified organizational 
structure.  The first section discussed benchmarking in greater detail.  The second section 
outlined the proposed organizational structure based on existing and proposed models 
previously described in the literature review.  The third section examined a qualitative 
analysis of overlapping functions by military services to highlight areas of functional 
redundancy.  The fourth section, a quantitative assessment of the size of force, enabled 
comparison of functions between services in like units.  The fifth section provided a 
quantitative analysis of the DoD’s budget request.   The sixth section described 
methodology for benchmarking between services and linked benchmarking to 
organizational structure.  The final section presented a methodology by which to assess 
the non-financial benefits of a reorganized DoD.  The following chapter covers results of 
this proposed methodology as applied to the DoD’s budget request for FY2013.  Finally, 
Chapter V discusses analysis of the results, to include recommendations for future 
research and use within the DoD.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
Overview 
 
This chapter implements the methodology from Chapter III to evaluate the three 
investigative questions posed in Chapter I.  All results and subsequent analysis are for 
FY2013.     
 
IQ 1.  What functional areas overlap between military services? 
 
 The functions of the military services are defined in DoDD 5100.01.  A synopsis 
of these functions is consolidated in Appendix A.  For the reader’s convenience, these 
functions are further distilled in Table 4: 
Table 4.  Functional Redundancy Between Military Services 
Service-Specific Functions USA USN USMC USAF 
Land Operations     
Maritime Operations     
Air Operations    
Nuclear Operations    
Air and Missile Defense Operations    
Riverine Operations     
Space Operations    
Airborne Operations    
ISR Operations    
Civil Affairs Operations     
Aeromedical Evacuation Operations    
Establish Initial Military Government     
Civil Works Programs     
Security Operations     
Functions Common to all Military Services USA USN USMC USAF 
Training for Joint Operations and Joint Exercises    
Organize, Train, and Equip Forces    
Cyberspace Operations    
Special Operations    
Personnel Recovery Operations    
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 As delineated in Table 4, all but two of the service-specific functions defined in 
DoDD 5100.01 are redundant between two or more services.  Air operations are the most 
redundant function, common among all four services.  Land operations, air and missile 
defense operations, riverine operations, and space operations are redundant among three 
services.  Maritime operations, nuclear operations, airborne operations, ISR operations, 
aeromedical evacuation operations, establishment of initial military government, and civil 
works programs are redundant among two services.    Seven functional areas were 
excluded from further analysis because they did not meet the data inclusion criteria from 
Figure 8.   
 Maritime operations were excluded because the function is redundant between the 
USN and the USMC, but these services provide complimentary rather than redundant 
capability.  Nuclear operations were excluded because of the strategic importance of a 
nuclear triad across multiple functional realms.  Airborne operations and aeromedical 
evacuations were excluded because the USA and USAF provide complimentary, not 
redundant, capabilities under these overarching functional capabilities.  Riverine 
operations, establishment of initial military government, and civil works programs were 
excluded due to lack of size-of-force and or budget request data for these functions.  All 
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction    
Building Partnership Capacity    
Forcible Entry Operations    
Presidential Support    
Antiterrorism    
Support Civil Authorities    
Conduct Operational Testing and Evaluation    
Command and Control    
Force Protection    
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other redundant functions were analyzed in the next section in accordance with the 
methodology described in Chapter III. 
 
IQ 2.  Could the DoD reduce its budget requests by adopting a functionally-aligned, 
unified structure? 
 
 To answer this investigative question, size of force and budget request data for 
each functional area, by service, was collected using the worksheets from Table 2. and 
Table 3.  This data was divided between five appropriation titles used by the PPBES:  
Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, Military Construction, and Family 
Housing.  Research and Development and Revolving Funds were removed due to a lack 
of sufficient data in accordance with the data inclusion criteria from Figure 8.  The results 
and subsequent analysis of the research to answer this IQ are divided between three 
sections:  size-of-force data, budget request data, and operational efficiency results.   
 
 Size-of-Force Data Results 
 Utilizing service budget justification books, service and joint factsheets, and QDR 
and CRS reports, size-of-force data was collected on functions redundant to two or more 
military services.  Source data for figures in Table 5. Size-of-Force Results, are listed as 
endnotes.   
Table 5.  Size-of-Force Results 
 Size of Force (#) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel (K) 99.81 51.32 21.22 64.43 
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel (K) 447.81 266.92 176.12 259.73 
Civilian Personnel (K) 255.91 188.52 23.62 184.13 
Cadets (K) 4.51 4.52 -- 3.93 
PCS Moves (K) 266.84 162.15 99.96 147.37 
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2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours (K) 2938 10549 11703 
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) 19388 39839 52393 
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions 188 -- 410 -- 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance 1118 -- 16511 -- 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit -- 920 -- 6220
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported 22012 13414 -- 814 
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs 211513 319412 23512 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Personnel (K) 8081 7322 5123 
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population (K) 8081 5112 2212 5123 
Enlisted Recruit Output (K) 35.68 29.59 25.511 28.413 
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft -- 4812 -- 1917 
Rotary Wing Aircraft 17912 5412 2712 417 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft 214 5112 -- 715 
Strategic UAVs 1912 612 -- 2412 
Aircraft Modifications (TAI) 19388 39839 52393 
Repair/Spare Parts and Support (TAI) 19388 39839 52393 
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles 383112 -- 4012 -- 
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions -- 28012 -- 340316 
Tactical Missiles 200812 38912 -- 43412 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars 4312 912 -- -- 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained (M) 96217 49119 17819 63419 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained 988818 572621 79821 2655619
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 Size-of-Force Data Analysis 
 
 When analyzing size-of-force data, the unit of function is of fundamental 
importance.  In order to compare functions between services, a common point of 
reference is required.  This common point of reference is different for every function.  
For example, for air operations, total flying hours and total aircraft inventory (TAI) were 
selected because each unit represented the size of force provided for air operations from 
each of the four services.  Each unit of function was carefully selected to provide a 
meaningful comparison between services.  Consideration was given to commonality 
between services for both size-of-force units and availability of budget request data tied 
to those functions.  The next two sections describe the results and analysis of budget 
request data. 
 
 Budget Request Results 
 For each of the functions identified in Table 5, budget request data was collected 
from service budget justification books and budget summary reports.  This data 
represents the amount that each service requested during FY2013 to perform the 
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prescribed function.  Source data for figures in Table 6. Budget Request Results, are 
listed as endnotes.     
 
Table 6.  Budget Request Results 
 Budget Request Amount ($Million) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M) 111481 80065 28666 91317
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M) 272761 188405 104786 178227
Civilian Personnel ($M) 91178 81409 165811 836013
Cadets ($M) 781 775 -- 707 
PCS Moves ($M) 17871 10315 5666 12907
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours ($M) 7318 60539 477813 
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M) 5898 34999 1077313
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions ($M) 211178 -- 534811 -- 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M) 848 -- 9911 -- 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M) -- 2399 -- 48913 
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M) 11514 8614 -- 5914 
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs ($M) 128 609 24815 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Cost ($M) 130348 89979,11 781013
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population ($M) 41388 14649 68911 352113
Enlisted Recruit Output ($M) 5818 2569 18711 14813
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M) -- 547520 -- 312417 
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M) 412516 309623 79112 29417 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M) 1916 358623 -- 53917 
Strategic UAVs ($M) 53416 12523 -- 88517
Aircraft Modifications ($M) 127716 202923 361017
Repair/Spare Parts and Support ($M) 37616 165823 205317
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3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles 50612 -- 3712 -- 
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions ($M) -- 12812 -- 55812 
Tactical Missiles ($M) 44812 101712 -- 14412 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars ($M) 133812 39012 -- -- 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained ($M) 40178 21019 82511 264613 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M) 53020 26321 1821 58222 
DEPARTMENT TOTALS 102977 100325 79248 
DoD TOTAL 282550 
 
* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus 
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI. 
 
                                                 
20 Department of the Navy FY2013 Budget Submission Justification Book Volume 1, Aircraft 
Procurement, Navy.  (2012, February).  Retrieved from 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/13pres/BOOKS.htm 
 
 
 
 Budget Request Analysis 
 
 The budget requests for the functional areas assessed in Table 6 account for 
nearly $281 Billion USD, or 54% of the DoD’s $526.2 Billion USD Defense Budget 
Request for FY 2013.  Only functions of the military services were assessed.  Defense-
wide functions were not included.  Further, only active duty functions were assessed, 
analysis of guard and reserve functions was beyond the scope of this research.  
Additionally, only five of the seven appropriation titles were assessed.  Finally, within the 
appropriation titles that were assessed, not every functional area was examined based on 
criteria from Figure 8.  Collectively, these limitations account for the remaining 46% of 
the DoD’s budget request for FY 2013.   
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 Having obtained results from analysis of size of force and budget request data, the 
next step to answer this IQ is to overlay these results to determine operational efficiency 
rates for each redundant function within each service.  The next section provides 
operational efficiency results and analysis of potential budget request savings under a 
functionally-aligned unified DoD organizational structure.   
  
 Operational Efficiency Results 
 Knowing the results of the size of force and budget request analyses, the next 
analytical step is to overlay Table 5 and Table 6 to develop a table of operational 
efficiency rates.  These rates are displayed in Table 7, Operational Efficiency Rates.  The 
bolded/italicized rate represents the lowest rate for that function between the four military 
services.   
Table 7:  Operational Efficiency Rates 
 Rate ($Million/Unit of Function) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M/Officer) 0.1117 0.1561 0.1352 0.1418
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M/Enlisted) 0.0609 0.0706 0.0595 0.0686
Civilian Personnel ($M/Civilian) 0.0356 0.0432 0.0703 0.0454
Cadets ($M/Cadet) 0.0173 0.0171 -- 0.0179 
PCS Moves ($M/PCS Move) 0.0067 0.0064 0.0057 0.0088
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours ($M/Flying Hour) 0.0025 0.0057 0.0041 
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M/Aircraft) 0.3039 0.8785 2.0563 
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions ($M/Division) 1173.3 -- 1337.0 -- 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M/Vehicle) 0.7568 -- 0.6000 -- 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M/Satellite) -- 29.875 -- 7.887 
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M/Int. or Radar) 0.5227 0.6418 -- 7.3750 
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2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs ($M/UAV) 0.0057 0.01878 1.0553 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Cost ($M/Personnel) 0.0161 0.0123 0.0152
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population ($M/Personnel) 0.0051 0.0029 0.0031 0.0069 
Enlisted Recruits ($M/Recruit) 0.0163 0.0085 0.0073 0.0052 
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M/Aircraft) -- 114.06 -- 164.42 
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M/Aircraft) 23.045 57.333 29.296 73.500 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M/Aircraft) 9.5000 70.314 -- 77.000 
Strategic UAVs ($M/UAV) 28.105 20.833 -- 36.875 
Aircraft Modifications ($M/Aircraft) (TAI) 0.6588 0.5094 0.6891 
Repair/Spare Parts & Support ($M/Aircraft) (TAI) 0.1940 0.4162 0.3919 
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles ($M/Vehicle) 0.1321 -- 0.9325 -- 
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions ($M/Munitions) -- 0.4571 -- 0.1640 
Tactical Missiles ($M/Missile) 0.2231 2.6144 -- 0.3318 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars ($M/Int. or Radar) 31.116 43.333 -- -- 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained ($/Sq Ft) 4.1757 4.2790 4.6348 4.1735 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M/Unit) 0.0536 0.0459 0.0226 0.0219 
 
* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus 
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI. 
 
 
 The lowest rate from the four military services for each function represents a 
potential level of operational efficiency throughout the DoD.  The final analytical step is 
benchmarking these lowest rates across the DoD to estimate total budget request 
reductions under a functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure.  By overlaying 
Table 5 and Table 7, estimated budget request savings were calculated.  These estimated 
budget request savings are displayed in Table 8:  
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Table 8:  Benchmarked Budget Estimates 
 Budget Request Estimate ($Million) 
Functional Area USA USN USMC USAF 
1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M) 11148 5730 2368 7193
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M) 26644 15881 10478 15452
Civilian Personnel ($M) 9117 6711 840 6554
Cadets ($M) 77 77 -- 67 
PCS Moves ($M) 1521 924 566 840
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1.  Air Operations 
Flying Hours ($M) 731 2635 2925 
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M) 589 1210 1592 
2.2.  Land Operations 
Divisions ($M) 21117 -- 4693 -- 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M) 67 -- 99 -- 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M) -- 71 -- 489 
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M) 115 70 -- 4 
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs ($M) 12 18 1 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Cost ($M) 9938 8997 6298
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Training Events ($M) 2343 1464 641 1485 
Enlisted Recruits ($M) 185 153 133 148 
3.  Procurement 
3.1.  Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M) -- 5475 -- 2167 
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M) 4125 1244 622 92 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M) 19 485 -- 67 
Strategic UAVs ($M) 396 125 -- 500 
Aircraft Modifications ($M) 987 2029 2669 
Repair/Spare Parts & Support ($M) 376 773 1016 
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles ($M) 506 -- 5 -- 
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3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions ($M) -- 46 -- 558 
Tactical Missiles ($M) 448 87 -- 97 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars ($M) 1338 280 -- -- 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained ($M) 4017 2049 743 2646 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M) 217 125 17 582 
DEPARTMENT TOTALS 96033 77864 53442 
DoD TOTAL 227339 
 
* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus 
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI. 
 
 By subtracting the total estimated DoD budget request amount in Table 8 from the 
total DoD budget request amount from Table 6, the budget request savings are estimated 
at $55 Billion USD for FY 2013.  This reduction equates to a 19% reduction in budget 
request for those functions analyzed.  For ease of comparison, Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 are 
consolidated at Appendix C, Consolidated Results for IQ 2.   
  
 Sensitivity Analysis 
 These results assume perfect extrapolation of the lowest operational efficiency 
rates across the entire DoD.  While this logic holds in theory, in practice, extrapolating 
rates across the entire DoD will likely yield a more uncertain outcome.  To improve the 
fidelity of these results, the budget request savings are estimated by extrapolating the 2nd 
lowest rates for each function from Table 7.  The result is an operational trade-space that 
provides a more accurate estimate of potential budget request savings under the proposed 
functionally-aligned structure.  Budget request calculations using higher rates are 
presented in Appendix D, Sensitivity Analysis for IQ2.   
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 Using the 2nd lowest rate, budget request savings are estimated at $7 Billion USD 
for FY 2013.  Working in the opposite direction, if the 19% savings calculated in Table 8 
were extrapolated across the entire $526.2 Billion USD DoD budget request for FY 2013, 
the estimated savings would be roughly $100 Billion USD.  The estimated budget request 
savings trade space under the proposed functionally-aligned structure is $7 Billion to 
$100 Billion USD for FY 2013.  These savings should theoretically apply to every budget 
request in future fiscal year in which the proposed structure is implemented.   
 
IQ 3.  What are the non-financial implications of a functionally-aligned, unified 
structure? 
 
 A content analysis of the relevant literature presented in Chapter II provides a list 
of potential non-financial benefits to reorganizing the DoD’s current structure.  These 
espoused benefits stem from various viewpoints on organizational reform.  Each potential 
benefit was assessed against the backdrop of the proposed DoD organizational structure 
presented in Figure 7.  Only those potential benefits that may result from this proposed 
structure were included in this analysis.  The results of this analysis are presented 
alphabetically by source in Table 9: 
 
Table 9:  Non-Financial Benefits of Proposed DoD Structure 
Potential Benefit Source 
Establish a cohesive military culture of shared values Fautua, 2000: 86 
Consistency between training for, and operational 
execution of, functional missions  
Jones, 1996: 27 
Enables joint staff to tackle tough decisions once shrouded 
in service parochialism 
Jones, 1996: 27 
Reduces conflicts of interest between senior service leaders Jones, 1996: 27 
Improved flexibility and speed of national command 
control 
Kaplan, 1993: 15 
Keskel, 2002: 54 
Pagan 14 
Removing service departments streamlines PPBES process Kaplan, 1993: 15 
Consolidation and reduction of real property footprint Kaplan, 1993: 16 
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More efficient acquisition process – reduce procurement of 
redundant  and non-interoperable systems 
Kaplan, 1993: 16 
Keskel, 2002: 50 
Single personnel system for military and civilians across all 
corps 
Kaplan, 1993: 17 
Common regulations, rules, and standards for each function Kaplan, 1993: 17 
Roles and mission controversy between service would ease Kaplan, 1993: 17 
Nunn, 1996: 64 
Maintains current force capabilities without “hollowing” 
out force 
Kaplan, 1993: 26 
Corps able to focus on core competencies (teeth) and allow 
defense-wide agencies to focus on support functions (tail) 
Keskel, 2002: 49 
Significant reduction in duplication between services in 
operational and support functions 
Keskel, 2002: 49 
Greater flexibility to the joint force commander to execute 
military operations in support of NSS 
Keskel, 2002: 49 
Quinn, 1993: 163 
Increased interoperability through truly joint systems Keskel, 2002: 50 
Increased coordination between corps and between corps 
and external agencies 
Martignetti, 2011: 38 
Corps structure allows for a quicker, more comprehensive 
response as new missions emerge (i.e. possible 
establishment of a Cyber Corps) 
Nunn, 1996: 64 
Allows for broader organizational concepts for national 
security 
Nunn, 1996: 65 
Reduction in staff duplication streamlines the organization 
allowing for better management 
Nunn, 1996: 66 
Pagan, 2003: 7 
Improved strategic vision across DoD Pagan, 2003: 8 
 
 The list of potential benefits in Table 9 is certainly not comprehensive, but it 
represents many of the non-financial merits of reorganizing the DoD under a unified, 
functionally-aligned structure.  However, absent implementation of the reengineering 
efforts described in the previous chapter, it is difficult to assess which, if any, of these 
benefits might actually be realized.   
 
Summary 
This chapter implemented the methodology from Chapter III to evaluate the three 
investigative questions posed in Chapter I.  To answer IQ1, a synopsis of overlapping 
functionality between military services, as defined by DoDD 5100.01, was presented in 
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Table 4.  To answer IQ2, size-of-force and budget data were collected in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively.  This data was analyzed to determine operational efficiency rates by 
function as displayed in Table 7.  These rates were then benchmarked across the size-of-
force levels from Table 5 to estimate budget request savings under a unified, 
functionally-aligned organizational structure as displayed in Table 8.  The estimated 
budget request savings from this analysis was between $7 Billion and $100 Billion USD 
for FY2013.  To answer IQ3, a content analysis of relevant literature was conducted.  
Potential non-financial benefits of reengineering the DoD’s organizational structure are 
displayed in Table 9.  The final chapter of this research recommends area for enhanced 
analysis and future study before summarizing conclusions. 
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V. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Overview 
 The recommendations in this chapter stem from the results and analysis presented 
in the previous chapter.  Recommendations are divided into three sections.  The first 
section examines the need for more accurate cost and budget data to improve the fidelity 
of this research.  The second section addresses potential resistance to the findings of this 
research.  The third section delineates areas for future research.  Finally, conclusions 
from this research are presented.   
 
Requirement for Better Data 
 The data for this research was pulled from DoD and military service budget 
request data for FY2013.  It is important to clarify that budgets and cost are not 
synonymous.  Up to this point, discussion has been on budget requests, not costs.  The 
difference between budgets and costs and the importance of accurate cost and budget data 
is now examined.       
Budgets are estimated levels of financial resources required to accomplish a 
functional activity.  Under traditional approaches, current year budgets are typically 
produced through negotiation to within a few percentage points of the previous year’s 
budget (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998).  However, in the absence of accurate cost data, budgets 
may be woefully inaccurate.   
Costs are the amount of financial resources actually expended to accomplish a 
functional activity.  According to Cooper & Kaplan, most organizations, operating under 
a traditional cost accounting (TCA) system, have little knowledge of what it costs an 
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organization to perform its required functions.  Under TCA, an organization will allocate 
all of its costs via direct labor, equipment, or material costs, completely ignoring indirect 
and support costs.  The DoD utilizes a TCA approach to allocate overhead costs 
throughout its vast hierarchical system.  An alternative to TCA is activity-based costing 
(ABC) (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998). 
ABC assigns direct, indirect, and support costs to the functions that consume 
organizational resources.  Costs are tied to a particular product, customer, or process 
instead of being arbitrarily spread over an entire operation.  According to Cooper & 
Kaplan, ABC systems seek to answer four fundamental questions: 
1.  What activities are being performed by the organizational resources? 
2.  How much does it cost to perform organizational activities and business 
processes?   
3.  Why does the organization need to perform activities and business processes? 
4.  How much of each activity is required for the organization’s products services 
and customers?  (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998: 79) 
 
The product of ABC is a much clearer picture for managers and leaders seeking to 
understand the “economics of their operations.” (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998: 3)  ABC is a 
system by which managers can more accurately account for the consumption of financial 
resources.  According to Cooper & Kaplan, ABC is a necessary predicate to effective and 
accurate organizational budgeting through activity-based budgeting (ABB).  
ABB is simply ABC in reverse.  ABC assigns costs to functions based on the 
resources consumed by that function; ABB uses this cost data to estimate the amount of 
financial resources needed to operate required functions in the next fiscal period (Cooper 
& Kaplan, 1998).  Instead of using the budget from the previous fiscal period as the 
starting point for the current budget, under ABB, budgets are calculated from scratch 
based on the anticipated costs required to perform the required functions of the 
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organization.  The result is that, under ABB, budget requests and organizational costs are 
very closely aligned and every dollar is accurately traced to specific functions.   
This research estimates a $7 Billion to $100 Billion USD FY2013 budget 
reduction by reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned organizational 
structure.  These results however are based on budget request data derived from TCA 
principles.  Therefore, the accuracy of this budget request data is questionable.  $7 Billion 
to $100 Billion USD is a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of potential savings.  Before 
proceeding with any reengineering efforts, the DoD must accurately assign costs to the 
functions it performs.  The DoD must be able to articulate the cost to operate an F-22, a 
Stryker Brigade, or a Navy Cruiser, it must understand the direct, indirect, and support 
costs of organizing, training, and equipping its personnel.  Only when these costs are 
delineated under an ABC, and subsequently ABB, model, is a more accurate estimate of 
potential financial savings possible.  Cooper & Kaplan (1998) argue that there are four 
fundamental steps to developing an ABC system. 
First, an organization must develop an activity dictionary identifying the activities 
it performs.  An activity is a verb and an associated object, i.e. fly aircraft.  This 
dictionary describes in aggregate what the organization does.  DODD 5100.01 provides 
an excellent jumping off point for building a DoD activity dictionary. 
Second, an organization must determine the amount of resources spent on each 
activity.  This is an arduous task for an organization as large as the DoD.  However, 
delineating how much direct, indirect, and support resources are required to support 
activities is imperative to implementing ABC and ABB models and understanding the 
economic roadmap of the organization.  An important consideration in this step is the 
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development of a hierarchy of activities by which costs are assigned at the level where 
resources are consumed.  Such insight is extremely meaningful in a hierarchically-
structured organization like the DoD. 
The third step is to identify the organization’s products, services, or customers.  
An organization must be able to articulate why it necessary to perform the activities it 
does.  According to Cooper & Kaplan, the reason that an organization performs activities 
is to “design, build, and deliver products and services to its customer.” (Cooper & 
Kaplan, 1998: 94)  The military services perform activities to accomplish functional 
activities for their customer, the combatant commander.  This is the link between ABC 
and BPR.  Reengineering involves radically changing processes, which are collections of 
activities, to provide value to the customer (Hammer & Champy, 1993).  The customer 
must be the object in focus during both ABC and BPR initiatives.   
The final step is to select activity cost drivers that link activity costs to the 
organization’s products, services, and customers.  Cooper & Kaplan define an activity 
cost driver as a “quantitative measure of the output of an activity.” (Cooper & Kaplan, 
1998: 95)  Cost drivers can be transaction-, duration-, or intensity-based.  The activity 
hierarchy described in step 2 provides the framework for matching the level of cost to an 
associated activity at the same hierarchical level.  Unit-level activities should have unit-
level activity drivers; division-level activities should have division-level activity drivers; 
etc.   
This section provided an elementary overview of ABC and ABB in relation to the 
DoD.  The brevity of this section is not intended to diminish the importance of its 
content.  The DoD must have an accurate understanding of which activities consume 
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which resources at what level before considering reengineering.  Even if the DoD were to 
develop an ABC system and leverage that system to implement ABB, there would likely 
be resistance to the model proposed by this research.  The next section discusses this 
potential resistance via a content analysis of literature reviewed in Chapter II.    
 
Resistance to Research 
 The results in Chapter IV highlight several potential financial and non-financial 
benefits of the unified, functionally-aligned organizational structure proposed by this 
research.  Despite these potential benefits, existing literature suggests considerable 
resistance to any major changes to the current DoD organizational structure.  Through 
content analysis of the literature examined in Chapter II, this section addresses six major 
points of potential resistance against adopting the proposed model.      
 The first point of resistance is one of politics.  The Constitution of the United 
States, Article One, Section Eight lists the powers enumerated to Congress regarding the 
establishment and organization of a military.  The US Military serves to uphold 
constitutional ideals at the will of Congress.  The current DoD organizational structure is 
physically, financially, and culturally rooted in all 50 states and most congressional 
districts.  Communities across the country typically welcome military installations 
because of the economic stimulus and social prestige they afford.  Congressional in-
fighting to maintain respective slices of the military pie is a reality.  The lack of 
successful Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) implementation in recent history 
highlights the juxtaposition that congressional leaders face between reducing the DoD’s 
footprint to realize financial savings and maintaining a position of favor with their 
respective electorates.   
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The changes proposed by recent BRAC initiatives pale in comparison to the 
changes proposed by this research.  Reengineering the DoD is likely to be politically 
inauspicious.  However, it should be noted that this research proposes very few 
reductions in personnel, missions, or installations.  Instead, this research argues for the 
functional reorientation of these personnel, missions, and installations to improve their 
operational efficiency.   
 The second point of resistance regards the history and tradition of the Military 
Services.  Three of the four US Military Services have histories dating back over 200 
years to the very foundations of the United States.  These are revered heritages in which 
many service members, both past and present, find their very identity.  To illustrate this 
point, suppose an Army officer, Naval petty officer, Marine sergeant, or Air Force airmen 
were asked, “Who do you work for?”  Their answers would likely be the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Air Force respectively.  While these answers are correct, it is also 
valid to say that all four of these individuals work for the DoD or the USG.  Most service 
members identify with their respective services, not their government, or governmental 
department.   
The model proposed by this research attempts to unify the US Military and in so 
doing, it attempts to dissolve service-centric mentalities and unhealthy service 
parochialism.  However, the proposed model maintains room for the continuation of 
history and tradition under newly designated functional corps.  The heritage of individual 
units could continue as units are realigned, not eliminated.   
A final thought regarding service heritage is one of perspective.  The military 
services have rich histories and time-honored traditions; but these service histories and 
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traditions fall under a much grander umbrella of history and tradition that is the United 
States of America.  If an alternative DoD organizational structure provides the United 
States with financial and operational advantages over the status quo, should not such a 
structure be given due consideration?   
 A third point of resistance is based on the argument that a certain degree of 
service parochialism is healthy and beneficial for the wellbeing of the US Military.  The 
principles of free market economics dictate that competition between firms provides a 
better product or service at a better price over monopolistic or socialistic settings.  The 
argument could be made of competition between the services—through competition with 
each other, the military services can better serve combatant commanders and American 
citizens.   
This logic is flawed however; there is a difference between inter-firm and intra-
firm competition.  Firms that compete with themselves internally will likely not optimize 
their overall performance.  If different divisions in a firm seek local optimums at the 
expense of the firm’s overall wellbeing, the firm will not perform to its’ potential.  If 
however, divisions are unified in their effort to maximize the overall performance of the 
firm, then, and only then, will the firm optimize its performance.  The DoD is a single 
government department (firm) and the Military Services (divisions) must be unified in 
their efforts to provide the best service to combatant commanders, elected civilian 
officials, and American citizens (customers).                     
 The fourth point of resistance concerns the consolidation of civilian control under 
the DoD.  Currently, the Military Service Secretaries maintain control over their 
respective services.  Under the proposed model, civilian control would be consolidated 
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with the SECDEF.  Does this consolidation erode constitutionally-mandated civilian 
control of the military?  Further, the current division of power between the military 
services provides an internal check and balance for the DoD.  Under the proposed model, 
this check and balance would be diminished.   
While these points are valid, they are perhaps shortsighted. Under the proposed 
model, civilian control would still reside with the SECDEF, Congress, and National 
Command Authority.  Raising the level of civilian control above Service Secretaries does 
not diminish the importance of that control; conversely, it emphasizes the need for 
civilian control to be overarching with a focus on national defense instead of the defense 
of service-centric interests.   
 A fifth point of resistance is that by consolidating functions under corps, 
interoperability of forces might diminish.  A lack of interoperability between military 
forces has, in the past, caused problems for the DoD (i.e. fratricide during Operation 
Provide Comfort).  Joint exercises are intended to overcome interoperability challenges.  
Under the proposed model, joint exercises would continue to serve this purpose.  
However, unlike today, under the proposed model, actions within functional areas would 
already be coordinated.  For example, all forces aligned under the Air Corps would 
already function under a set of standardized doctrine, regulations, and operating 
procedures.  The challenge of interoperability between functions would remain, but 
interoperability challenges within functions would largely disappear.   
 A final point of resistance is the consolidation of support functions under defense-
wide agencies and activities.  Currently, each Military Service provides forces to 
accomplish support functions to sustain the service’s operational mission.  Each service’s 
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support requirements are uniquely tied to the operational mission of that service.  While 
there is considerable redundancy across these support functions between services, the 
requirements are not universal.  Additionally, if support functions were consolidated, 
operational commanders would have much less control over the quantity, quality, and 
timeliness of those support functions.  These are valid concerns.  Under the proposed 
model, careful consideration would need to be given to which functions are truly tied to 
the operational functionality of the corps.  Those functions that are truly unique to the 
corps’ operational capability should be retained within that corps.  All other functions 
should be consolidated at the DoD level.  To delineate between these two categories, a 
DoD-wide, function-by-function, analysis would be required.  Such analysis is beyond 
the scope of this research.   
  
Areas for Future Research 
 The scope of this research is vast.  Attempting to understand the interrelation of 
the history, organization, and budget of the DoD is an enormous undertaking.  This 
research merely scratches the surface of this immense topic.  Therefore, there are several 
areas recommended for future research.   
 First, the proposed methodology could be refined.  With more detailed budget 
data and more time, future researchers could provide a more detailed comparison of areas 
of overlapping functionality between Military Services.  Choosing units of comparison at 
a sub-aggregate level may improve the accuracy and fidelity of this research.  
Second, the proposed methodology could be applied across multiple fiscal years.  
FY2013 was selected for this research because it was the most recent fiscal year for 
which all required data was available at the time when analysis began.  Comparing results 
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across fiscal years could yield a more accurate estimate of potential cost savings under a 
unified, functionally-aligned DoD organizational structure.   
 As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the accuracy of this research could 
be much improved through the utilization of an ABC/ABB system for the DoD.  Future 
research could use the four steps identified by Cooper & Kaplan (1998) to develop a 
comprehensive framework by which the DoD could adapt an ABC/ABB system.   
A fourth area for future research would be a Delphi study by senior DoD leaders 
to delineate which support functions should reside with their respective functional corps 
and which should be consolidated under the purview of the defense-wide agencies and 
activities.  This study could also cross-examine DODD 5100.01 to determine which 
functional areas of the DoD are truly redundant. 
Fifth, a small-scale pilot study could be conducted as proof of concept for 
proposed methodology.  For example, the DoD’s current joint-basing initiatives could be 
analyzed using the methodology proposed here within.  This analysis would likely yield 
very useful information regarding the practical implementation of this research. 
Finally, a study of increasing returns to scale could yield additional potential 
savings over those identified in this research.  According to Richard de Neufville:   
Returns to scale reflect the proportionate increase in output when all inputs to the 
design change proportionately. (De Neufville, 1990: 52) 
 
As functions are consolidated under their respective corps, additional financial 
savings may be realized due to the higher operational efficiency of a larger functional 
force operating in a unified manner.  This research estimates budget savings based on 
benchmarked operating efficiency of current operating efficiencies.  Examining the effect 
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of increasing returns to scale may yield higher budget savings based on potential 
operating efficiency.     
 
Conclusions 
 The DoD and the USG face an uncertain fiscal future.  While the current DoD 
organizational structure affords the United States a world-class military, it does so at a 
cost.  The functional redundancy of the Military Services and the parochial service 
infighting it produces diminishes the operational efficiency of the US Military.  Working 
towards reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned organizational 
structure may yield significant financial and non-financial benefits to combatant 
commanders and American citizens.   
The model proposed by this research attempts to delineate the “tooth” from the 
“tail” of the current DoD structure.  Under the proposed model, core operational missions 
would be realigned under functional corps.  All other support functions would be divided 
between defense-wide agencies and activities.  Finally, civilian control of the military 
would be consolidated under the SECDEF with the dissolution of the service secretary 
positions.   
As redundant functions, which were previously accomplished by the services, are 
realigned under functional corps, benchmarked operational efficiency rates between the 
services by function yields a baseline estimate for financial savings.  The potential budget 
request reduction for FY2013 under this proposed model is estimated to be between $7 
Billion and $100 Billion USD.   
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The non-financial benefits of the proposed model are numerous and varied.  As 
summarized in Table 9, these benefits focus on the improved interoperability of military 
forces and resulting increased operational efficiency.     
This research is not intended to be comprehensive.  Several thought papers have 
been written proposing alternative models to the DoD structure; this research is intended 
to provide a quantitative methodology by which to assess the potential fiscal savings of 
those alternative structures.  Vast areas of future research exist, the implications of which 
may result in a fundamental, radically different, reengineering of current and future DoD 
operations.   
Historic changes to the United States’ military construct have coincided with 
times of great change in world politics.  The National Security Act of 1947 came on the 
heels of the Second World War.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was born in the 
dwindling light of the Cold War.  Today’s uncertain geopolitical climate and the USG’s 
fiscally-unbalanced posture may provide a compulsory backdrop for yet another historic 
change to the DoD.  My hope is that this research provides meaningful insight towards 
positive change.  
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Appendix A.  Synopsis of DODD 5100.01 
(Source:  DoDD 5100.01, Enclosure 6, December 21, 2010) 
 
Functions common to all Military 
Departments 
Functions common to all Military 
Services 
 
1.a.1.    Recruiting. 
 
1.a.2.    Organizing. 
 
1.a.3.    Supplying. 
 
1.a.4.    Equipping (including research and 
development). 
 
1.a.5.    Training. 
 
1.a.6.    Servicing. 
 
1.a.7.    Mobilizing. 
 
1.a.8.    Demobilizing. 
 
1.a.9.    Administering (including the morale and 
welfare of personnel). 
 
1.a.10.    Maintaining. 
 
1.a.11.    Construction, outfitting, and repairs of 
military equipment. 
 
1.a.12.    Construction, maintenance, and repair of 
buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the 
acquisition, management, and disposal of real 
property and natural resources. 
 
2.a.    Develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, 
equip, and provide land, naval, air, space, and 
cyberspace forces, in coordination with the other 
Military Services, Combatant Commands, USG 
departments and agencies, and international 
partners, as required, that enable joint force 
commanders to conduct decisive operations across 
the spectrum of conflict in order to achieve the 
desired end state. 
 
2.b.    Determine Military Service force 
requirements and make recommendations 
concerning force requirements to support national 
security objectives and strategy and to meet the 
operational requirements of the Combatant 
Commands. 
 
2.c.    Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the 
assignment and deployment of forces to the 
Combatant Commands established by the 
President through the Secretary of Defense. 
 
2.d.    Monitor and assess Military Service 
operational readiness and capabilities of forces 
for assignment to the Combatant Commands and 
plan for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of the 
other Military Services and USSOCOM that may 
be made available. 
 
2.e.    Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for employment by Military Service 
forces and: 
 
2.e.1.    Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in the development of joint doctrine. 
 
2.e.2.    Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the 
other Military Services, USG departments and 
agencies, partner security forces, and non-
governmental organizations, in the development of 
the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures 
necessary for participation in and/or command of 
joint, interagency, and multinational operations. 
 
2.e.3.    Coordinate with the Commander, 
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USSOCOM, in the development of the doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by 
Military Service forces when related to special 
operations. 
 
2.f.    Provide for training for joint operations 
and joint exercises in support of Combatant 
Command operational requirements, including the 
development of Military Service joint training 
requirements, policies, procedures, and 
publications. 
 
2.g.    Provide logistical support for Military 
Service and all forces assigned to joint commands, 
including procurement, distribution, supply, 
equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise 
directed by the Secretary of Defense. 
 
2.h.    Organize, train, and equip forces to 
contribute unique service capabilities to the joint 
force commander to conduct the following 
functions across all domains, including land, 
maritime, air, space, and cyberspace: 
 
2.h.1.    Intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance (ISR), and information 
operations, to include electronic warfare and 
MISO in order to provide situational awareness 
and enable decision superiority across the range of 
military operations. 
 
2.h.2.    Offensive and defensive cyberspace 
operations to achieve cyberspace superiority in 
coordination with the other Military Services, 
Combatant Commands, and USG departments and 
agencies. 
 
2.h.3.    Special operations in coordination with 
USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands, the 
Military Services, and other DoD Components. 
 
2.h.4.    Personnel recovery operations in 
coordination with USSOCOM and other 
Combatant Commands, the Military Services, and 
other DoD Components. 
 
2.h.5.    Counter weapons of mass destruction. 
 
2.h.6.    Building partnership capacity/security 
force assistance operations. 
 
2.h.7.    Forcible entry operations. 
 
2.h.8.    Missile Defense. 
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2.h.9.    Other functions as assigned, such as 
Presidential support and antiterrorism. 
 
2.i.    Organize, train, and equip forces to 
conduct support to civil authorities in the 
United States and abroad, to include support for 
disaster relief, consequence management, mass 
migration, disease eradication, law enforcement, 
counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection, 
and response to terrorist attack, in coordination 
with the other Military Services, Combatant 
Commands, National Guard, and USG 
departments and agencies. 
 
2.j.    Operate organic land vehicles, aircraft, 
cyber assets, spacecraft or space systems, and 
ships or craft. 
 
2.k.    Conduct operational testing and 
evaluation. 
 
2.l.    Provide command and control. 
 
2.m.    Provide force protection. 
 
2.n.    Consult and coordinate with the other 
Military Services on all matters of joint 
concern.
 
Functions of the Department 
of the Army 
Functions of the Department 
of the Navy 
Functions of The 
Department of the 
Air Force 
 
4.a.    The Department of the Army 
includes land combat, and service 
forces, and such aviation, water 
transport, and space and cyberspace 
forces as may be organic therein, 
and shall be organized, trained, and 
equipped primarily for prompt and 
sustained combat incident to 
operations on land, and to support 
the other Military Services and joint 
forces. The Army is responsible for 
the preparation of land forces 
necessary for the effective 
prosecution of war and military 
operations short of war, except as 
otherwise assigned. The Army is 
the Nation’s principal land force 
and promotes national values and 
interests by conducting military 
engagement and security 
cooperation; deterring aggression 
 
5.a.    The Department of the Navy 
is composed of naval, land, air, 
space, and cyberspace forces, both 
combat and support, not otherwise 
assigned, to include those organic 
forces and capabilities necessary to 
operate, and support the Navy and 
Marine Corps, the other Military 
Services, and joint forces. The Navy 
and Marine Corps comprise the 
Nation’s principal maritime force. 
They employ the global reach, 
persistent presence through forward-
stationed and rotationally-based 
forces, and operational flexibility to 
secure the Nation from direct attack; 
secure strategic access and retain 
global freedom of action; strengthen 
existing and emerging alliances and 
partnerships; establish favorable 
security conditions; deter aggression 
 
6.a.    The Department of 
the Air Force is composed 
of air, space, and 
cyberspace forces, both 
combat and support, not 
otherwise assigned. The 
Air Force is the Nation’s 
principal air and space 
force, and is responsible 
for the preparation of forces 
necessary for the effective 
prosecution of war. The 
Department of the Air 
Force shall organize, train, 
equip, and provide air, 
space, and cyberspace 
forces for the conduct of 
prompt and sustained 
combat operations, military 
engagement, and security 
cooperation in defense of 
 
 
87 
 
and violence; and should deterrence 
fail, compelling enemy behavioral 
change or compliance. The Army 
shall contribute forces through a 
rotational, cyclical readiness model 
that provides a predictable and 
sustainable supply of modular forces 
to the Combatant Commands, and a 
surge capacity for unexpected 
contingencies. 
and violence by state, non-state, and 
individual actors and, should 
deterrence fail, prosecute the full 
range of military operations in 
support of U.S. national interests. 
the Nation, and to support 
the other Military Services 
and joint forces. The Air 
Force will provide the 
Nation with global 
vigilance, global reach, and 
global power in the form of 
in-place, forward-based, 
and expeditionary forces 
possessing the capacity to 
deter aggression and 
violence by state, non-state, 
and individual actors to 
prevent conflict, and, 
should deterrence fail, 
prosecute the full range of 
military operations in 
support of U.S. national 
interests. 
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Functions of the 
Army 
Functions of the 
Navy 
Functions of the 
Marine Corps 
Functions of the 
Air Force 
Land Operations 
 
4.b.1.    Conduct prompt 
and sustained combined 
arms combat 
operations on land in 
all environments and 
types of terrain, 
including complex 
urban environments, in 
order to defeat enemy 
ground forces, and 
seize, occupy, and 
defend land areas. 
 
4.b.7.    Interdict enemy 
sea, space, air power, 
and communications 
through operations on 
or from the land.  
 
4.b.13.    Operate land 
lines of 
communication. 
 
5.b.1.   Conduct 
offensive and defensive 
operations associated 
with the maritime 
domain including 
achieving and 
maintaining sea control, 
to include subsurface, 
surface, land, air, space, 
and cyberspace. 
 
 
5.c.3.    Conduct land 
and air operations 
essential to the 
prosecution of a naval 
campaign or as directed. 
 
5.c.4.    Conduct 
complex expeditionary 
operations in the urban 
littorals and other 
challenging 
environments. 
 
Maritime Operations 
  
5.b.1.   Conduct 
offensive and defensive 
operations associated 
with the maritime 
domain including 
achieving and 
maintaining sea control, 
to include subsurface, 
surface, land, air, space, 
and cyberspace. 
 
5.b.2.    Provide power 
projection through 
sea-based global strike, 
to include nuclear and 
conventional 
capabilities; interdiction 
and interception 
capabilities; maritime 
and/or littoral fires, to 
include naval surface 
fires; and close air 
support for ground 
forces. 
 
5.b.6.    Establish, 
maintain, and defend 
 
5.c.1.   Seize and 
defend advanced naval 
bases or lodgments to 
facilitate subsequent 
joint operations. 
 
5.c.4.    Conduct 
complex expeditionary 
operations in the urban 
littorals and other 
challenging 
environments. 
 
5.c.5.    Conduct 
amphibious 
operations, including 
engagement, crisis 
response, and power 
projection operations to 
assure access. The 
Marine Corps has 
primary responsibility 
for the development of 
amphibious doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and 
equipment. 
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sea bases in support of 
naval, amphibious, land, 
air, or other joint 
operations as directed. 
Air Operations 
  
5.b.1.   Conduct 
offensive and defensive 
operations associated 
with the maritime 
domain including 
achieving and 
maintaining sea control, 
to include subsurface, 
surface, land, air, space, 
and cyberspace. 
 
5.b.2.    Provide power 
projection through sea-
based global strike, to 
include nuclear and 
conventional 
capabilities; interdiction 
and interception 
capabilities; maritime 
and/or littoral fires, to 
include naval surface 
fires; and close air 
support for ground 
forces. 
 
5.c.3.    Conduct land 
and air operations 
essential to the 
prosecution of a naval 
campaign or as directed. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.c.2.    Provide close 
air support for ground 
forces. 
 
6.b.2.    Conduct 
offensive and defensive 
operations, to include 
appropriate air and 
missile defense, to gain 
and maintain air 
superiority, and air 
supremacy as required, 
to enable, the conduct of 
operations by U.S. and 
allied land, sea, air, 
space, and special 
operations forces. 
 
6.b.3.    Conduct global 
precision attack, to 
include strategic 
attack, interdiction, 
close air support, and 
prompt global strike. 
 
6.b.6.    Provide rapid 
global mobility to 
employ and sustain 
organic air and space 
forces and other 
Military Service and 
USSOCOM forces, as 
directed, to include 
airlift forces for 
airborne operations, 
air logistical support, 
tanker forces for in-
flight refueling, and 
assets for aeromedical 
evacuation. 
 
6.b.9.    Conduct global 
integrated command and 
control for air and space 
operations. 
Nuclear Operations 
  
5.b.9.    Conduct 
nuclear operations in 
support of strategic 
deterrence, to include 
providing and 
maintaining nuclear 
  
6.b.1.    Conduct 
nuclear operations in 
support of strategic 
deterrence, to include 
providing and 
maintaining nuclear 
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surety and capabilities. 
 
5.b.2.    Provide power 
projection through sea-
based global strike, to 
include nuclear and 
conventional 
capabilities; interdiction 
and interception 
capabilities; maritime 
and/or littoral fires, to 
include naval surface 
fires; and close air 
support for ground 
forces. 
surety and capabilities. 
Air and Missile Defense Operations 
 
4.b.2.    Conduct air 
and missile defense to 
support joint campaigns 
and assist in achieving 
air superiority.  
 
5.b.3.    Conduct 
ballistic missile 
defense. 
  
6.b.2.    Conduct 
offensive and defensive 
operations, to include 
appropriate air and 
missile defense, to gain 
and maintain air 
superiority, and air 
supremacy as required, 
to enable, the conduct of 
operations by U.S. and 
allied land, sea, air, 
space, and special 
operations forces. 
Riverine Operations 
 
4.b.5.    Conduct 
riverine operations.  
 
5.b.5.    Conduct 
riverine operations. 
 
5.c.4.    Conduct 
complex expeditionary 
operations in the urban 
littorals and other 
challenging 
environments. 
 
5.c.5.    Conduct 
amphibious 
operations, including 
engagement, crisis 
response, and power 
projection operations to 
assure access. The 
Marine Corps has 
primary responsibility 
for the development of 
amphibious doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and 
equipment. 
 
Space Operations 
 
4.b.9.    Provide 
 
5.b.8.    Provide 
  
6.b.5.    Conduct 
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support for space 
operations to enhance 
joint campaigns, in 
coordination with the 
other Military Services, 
Combatant Commands, 
and USG departments 
and agencies.  
support for joint space 
operations to enhance 
naval operations, in 
coordination with the 
other Military Services, 
Combatant Commands, 
and USG departments 
and agencies. 
offensive and defensive 
operations to gain and 
maintain space 
superiority to enable 
the conduct of 
operations by U.S. and 
allied land, sea, air, 
space, and cyberspace 
forces. Conduct space 
operations to enhance 
joint campaigns, in 
coordination with the 
other Military Services, 
Combatant Commands, 
and USG departments 
and agencies. 
 
6.b.9.    Conduct global 
integrated command and 
control for air and space 
operations. 
Airborne Operations 
 
4.b.3.    Conduct 
airborne and air 
assault, and 
amphibious 
operations. The Army 
has primary 
responsibility for the 
development of airborne 
doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and 
equipment.  
   
6.b.6.    Provide rapid 
global mobility to 
employ and sustain 
organic air and space 
forces and other 
Military Service and 
USSOCOM forces, as 
directed, to include 
airlift forces for 
airborne operations, 
air logistical support, 
tanker forces for in-
flight refueling, and 
assets for aeromedical 
evacuation. 
ISR Operations 
 
4.b.12.    Conduct 
reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and 
target acquisition.  
   
6.b.4.    Provide timely, 
global integrated ISR 
capability and capacity 
from forward deployed 
locations and globally 
distributed centers to 
support world-wide 
operations. 
Logistics Operations 
 
4.b.8.    Provide 
logistics to joint 
operations and 
campaigns, including 
joint over-the-shore and 
 
5.b.7.    Provide naval 
expeditionary logistics 
to enhance the 
deployment, 
sustainment, and 
  
6.b.7.    Provide agile 
combat support to 
enhance the air and 
space campaign and the 
deployment, 
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intra-theater transport of 
time-sensitive, mission-
critical personnel and 
materiel.  
redeployment of naval 
forces and other forces 
operating within the 
maritime domain, to 
include joint sea bases, 
and provide sea 
transport for the Armed 
Forces other than that 
which is organic to the 
individual Military 
Services and 
USSOCOM. 
employment, 
sustainment, and 
redeployment of air and 
space forces and other 
forces operating within 
the air and space 
domains, to include joint 
air and space bases, and 
for the Armed Forces 
other than which is 
organic to the individual 
Military Services and 
USSOCOM in 
coordination with the 
other Military Services, 
Combatant Commands, 
and USG departments 
and agencies. 
 
6.b.6.    Provide rapid 
global mobility to 
employ and sustain 
organic air and space 
forces and other 
Military Service and 
USSOCOM forces, as 
directed, to include 
airlift forces for airborne 
operations, air logistical 
support, tanker forces 
for in-flight refueling, 
and assets for 
aeromedical evacuation. 
Civil Affairs Operations 
 
4.b.4    Conduct civil 
affairs operations.  
   
Aeromedical Evacuation Operations 
 
4.b.11.    Provide intra-
theater aeromedical 
evacuation.  
   
6.b.6.    Provide rapid 
global mobility to 
employ and sustain 
organic air and space 
forces and other 
Military Service and 
USSOCOM forces, as 
directed, to include 
airlift forces for airborne 
operations, air logistical 
support, tanker forces 
for in-flight refueling, 
and assets for 
aeromedical 
evacuation. 
Establish Initial Military Government 
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4.b.6.   Occupy 
territories abroad and 
provide for the initial 
establishment of a 
military government 
pending transfer of this 
responsibility to other 
authority.  
  
5.c.6.    Conduct 
security and stability 
operations and assist 
with the initial 
establishment of a 
military government 
pending transfer of this 
responsibility to other 
authority. 
 
Civil Works Programs 
 
4.b.10.    Conduct 
authorized civil works 
programs, to include 
projects for 
improvement of 
navigation, flood 
control, beach erosion 
control, and other water 
resource developments 
in the United States, its 
territories, and its 
possessions, and 
conduct other civil 
activities prescribed by 
law.  
 
5.b.4.    Conduct ocean, 
hydro, and river 
survey and 
reconstruction. 
  
Security Operations 
   
5.c.7.    Provide security 
detachments and units 
for service on armed 
vessels of the Navy, 
provide protection of 
naval property at naval 
stations and bases, 
provide security at 
designated U.S. 
embassies and 
consulates, and perform 
other such duties as the 
President or the 
Secretary of Defense 
may direct. These 
additional duties may 
not detract from or 
interfere with the 
operations for which the 
Marine Corps is 
primarily organized. 
 
Personnel Recovery Operations 
    
6.b.8.    Conduct global 
personnel recovery 
operations including 
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theater-wide combat and 
civil search and rescue, 
in coordination with the 
other Military Services, 
USJFCOM, 
USSOCOM, and DoD 
Components. 
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Appendix B.  DoD Defense Agencies 
 
 
Defense Agencies 
Defense Agency Functional Mission Reference 
Defense Advanced 
Research Projects 
Agency 
Serves as the research and development 
(R&D) organization in DoD with a 
primary responsibility of maintaining 
U.S. technological superiority over our 
adversaries. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5134.10 
Defense 
Commissary 
Agency 
Provide an efficient and effective 
worldwide system of commissaries for 
the resale of groceries and related 
household items at reduced prices to 
members of the uniformed services, 
retired members, dependents of such 
members, and other authorized patrons, 
to enhance their quality of life and to 
support military readiness, recruitment, 
and retention. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.55 
Defense Contract 
Audit Agency 
Perform all necessary contract audits for 
the Department of Defense and provide 
accounting and financial advisory 
services regarding contracts and 
subcontracts to all DoD Components 
responsible for procurement and contract 
administration. These services shall be 
provided in connection with negotiation, 
administration, and settlement of 
contracts and subcontracts to ensure 
taxpayer dollars are spent on fair and 
reasonable contract prices. DCAA shall 
provide contract audit services to other 
Federal agencies, as appropriate. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.36 
Defense Contract 
Management 
Agency 
Perform Contract Administration 
Services (CAS) and Contingency 
Contract Administration Services 
(CCAS) for the DoD, other authorized 
Federal agencies, foreign governments, 
international organizations, and others as 
authorized. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.64 
Defense Finance 
and Accounting 
Service 
To provide finance and accounting 
services and monitoring compliance with 
all statutory and regulatory requirements 
within its functional area. It also includes 
the consolidation, standardization, and 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5118.05 
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integration of finance and accounting 
requirements, functions, procedures, and 
DFAS-assigned information systems 
within the DoD, while ensuring their 
proper relationship with other DoD 
functional areas such as budget, 
personnel, logistics, and acquisition. The 
DFAS shall direct, approve, and perform 
finance and accounting activities for the 
DoD, to include coordination and 
collaboration with all Defense Agencies, 
Military Departments, and Combatant 
Commands. Fulfilling this mission 
enables the DoD to execute a world-class 
business operation; deliver accurate, 
timely, and relevant financial 
information; and employ enhanced 
technological capabilities to provide 
critical finance and accounting services 
to DoD customers and stakeholders. 
Defense 
Information 
Systems Agency 
Responsible for planning, engineering, 
acquiring, testing, fielding, and 
supporting global net-centric information 
and communications solutions to serve 
the needs of the President, the Vice 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the DoD Components, under all 
conditions of peace and war. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.19 
Defense 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Satisfy the military and military-related 
intelligence requirements of the Secretary 
and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the DNI, and provide the military 
intelligence contribution to national 
foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence. DIA shall plan, 
manage, and execute intelligence 
operations during peacetime, crisis, and 
war. DIA shall serve as the DoD lead for 
coordinating intelligence support to meet 
COCOM requirements; lead efforts to 
align analysis, collection, and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) activities with all 
operations; and link and synchronize 
Military, Defense, and National 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.21 
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Intelligence capabilities. 
Defense Legal 
Services Agency 
Provide legal advice, services, and support 
to the Defense Agencies, DoD Field 
Activities, and, as assigned, other 
organizational entities within the DoD; 
administer the DoD Standards of Conduct 
Program; support and assist the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Legislative 
Affairs (ASD(LA)) in developing the DoD 
Legislative Program; oversee DoD 
personnel security processes as authorized 
by DoDD 5145.3 (Reference (d)) and in 
accordance with applicable issuances, 
including DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5220.22 
(Reference (e), DoDD 5200.02 (Reference 
(f)) and DoD 5200.2-R (Reference (g)); 
and provide fair and impartial 
administrative procedures through the 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA). 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5145.04 
Defense Logistics 
Agency 
Function as an integral element of the 
military logistics system of the 
Department of Defense to provide 
effective and efficient worldwide 
logistics support to the Military 
Departments and the Combatant 
Commands under conditions of peace 
and war, as well as to 
other DoD Components and Federal 
agencies, and, when authorized by law, 
State and local 
government organizations, foreign 
governments, and international 
organizations. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.22 
Defense Security 
Cooperation 
Agency 
Directs, administers, and provides DoD-
wide guidance to the DoD Components and 
DoD representatives to U.S. missions 
abroad for the execution of DoD security 
assistance and security cooperation 
programs over which DSCA has 
responsibility.
U.S. 
Department 
of Defense 
Directive 
DoDD 
5105.65 
 
Defense Security 
Service 
Manage and administer the DoD portion of 
the National Industrial Security Program 
(NISP) for the DoD Components and, by 
mutual agreement, other U.S. Government 
(USG) departments and agencies; provide 
security education and training products 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.42 
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and services; administer the industrial 
portion of the DoD Personnel Security 
Program (PSP), except for those cases that 
DSS refers to the Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA); provide 
authorized counterintelligence (CI) 
services; and manage and operate the 
associated program-specific information 
technology (IT) systems. The DSS shall 
also support DoD efforts to improve 
security programs and processes.
Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency 
Safeguard the United States and its allies 
from weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) threats globally.  DTRA has a 
unique role in DoD efforts regarding 
countering weapons of mass destruction 
(CWMD), and supports a broad range of 
activities across the CWMD mission. 
DTRA provides integrated technical and 
operational solutions, as well as 
intellectual capital, to inform and support 
both DoD and national-level policies and 
strategies to address WMD threats to the 
homeland as well as to the warfighter. As 
such, DTRA supports the CWMD 
activities of the U.S. Government (USG) 
and its allies at the nexus between WMD 
and terrorism. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.62 
Missile Defense 
Agency 
Manage, direct, and execute the 
development of the BMDS in accordance 
with National Security Presidential 
Directive 23 (Reference (h)) and to 
achieve DoD priorities to:  
a. Defend the United States, deployed 
forces, allies, and friends from ballistic 
missile attacks of all ranges in all phases 
of flight.  
b. Develop and deploy, as directed, a 
layered BMDS.  
c. Enable the fielding of elements of the 
BMDS as soon as practicable.  
d. Provide capability in blocks, 
improving the effectiveness of fielded 
capability by inserting new technologies 
as they become available. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5134.09 
National Support U.S. national security objectives U.S. Department of 
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Geospatial-
Intelligence 
Agency 
by providing timely, 
relevant, and accurate geospatial 
intelligence (GEOINT) to the Department 
of Defense, the 
Intelligence Community (IC), and other 
U.S. Government (USG) departments and 
agencies; 
conducting other intelligence-related 
activities essential for U.S. national 
security; providing 
GEOINT for safety of navigation 
information; preparing and distributing 
maps, charts, books, 
and geodetic products; designing, 
developing, operating, and maintaining 
systems related to the 
processing and dissemination of 
GEOINT; and providing GEOINT in 
support of the combat objectives of the 
Armed Forces of the United States. 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.60 
National 
Reconnaissance 
Office 
Responsible for research and development 
(R&D), acquisition, launch, deployment, 
and operation of overhead reconnaissance 
systems, and related data-processing 
facilities to collect intelligence and 
information to support national and DoD 
missions and other United States 
Government (USG) needs.
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.23 
National Security 
Agency/Central 
Security Service 
U.S. Government (USG) lead for 
cryptology, and its mission encompasses 
both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and 
Information Assurance (IA) activities. 
The Central Security Service (CSS) 
conducts SIGINT collection, processing, 
analysis, production, and dissemination, 
and other cryptologic operations as 
assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief, 
CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS). NSA/CSS 
provides SIGINT and IA guidance and 
assistance to the DoD Components, as 
well as national customers, pursuant to 
References (d) and (e). The 
DIRNSA/CHCSS serves as the principal 
SIGINT and IA advisor to the Secretary 
of Defense, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5100.20 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information 
Integration/DoD Chief Information 
Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO), the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries 
of the Military Departments, and the 
DNI, as well as other USG officials with 
regard to these missions and the 
responsibilities enumerated herein. 
Pentagon Force 
Protection Agency 
Provide force protection, security, and 
law enforcement to safeguard 
personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and 
other resources for the Pentagon 
Reservation and for assigned DoD 
activities and DoD-occupied facilities 
within the National Capital Region 
(NCR) (hereafter referred to as the 
“Pentagon Facilities”). This includes 
addressing the full spectrum of threats by 
utilizing a balanced strategy of 
comprehensive protective intelligence 
analysis, prevention, preparedness, 
detection, all-hazards response, DoD 
crisis management, and support to the 
lead emergency management agency. 
PFPA will be the DoD focal point for 
collaboration and coordination with other 
DoD Components, other Executive 
Departments and Agencies, and State and 
local authorities on matters involving 
force protection, security, and law 
enforcement activities that impact the 
Pentagon Facilities. PFPA will also 
provide comprehensive threat 
assessments, security, and protection 
services for OSD personnel and other 
DoD persons, as assigned. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.68 
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DoD Field Activities 
Field Activity Functional Mission Reference 
Defense Media 
Activity 
3.1. Provide a wide variety of information 
products to the entire DoD family (Active, 
Guard, and Reserve Military Service 
members, dependents, retirees, DoD 
civilians, and contract employees) and 
external audiences through all available 
media, including: motion and still imagery; 
print; radio; television; Web and related 
emerging Internet, mobile, and other 
communication technologies.  
3.2. Communicate messages and themes 
from senior DoD leaders (Secretary of 
Defense, Secretaries of the Military 
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Military Service Chiefs of Staff, 
Combatant Commanders), as well as other 
leaders in the chain-of-command, in order 
to support and improve quality of life and 
morale, promote situational awareness, 
provide timely and immediate force 
protection information, and sustain 
readiness.  
3.3. Provide U.S. radio and television 
news, information, and entertainment 
programming to Active, Guard, and 
Reserve Military Service members, DoD 
civilians and contract employees, and their 
families overseas, on board Navy and 
Coast Guard ships, and other authorized 
users.  
3.4. Provide, throughout the Department of 
Defense and to the American public, high 
quality visual information products, 
including Combat Camera imagery 
depicting U.S. military activities and 
operations.  
3.5. Provide joint education and training 
for military and civilian personnel in the 
public affairs, broadcasting, and visual 
information career fields to meet DoD-
wide entry level skills and long-term career 
development requirements. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.74 
Defense 
POW/Missing 
Leads the national effort to account for 
personnel, including members of the Armed 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
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Personnel Office Forces on active duty, DoD civilian 
employees, or employees of a DoD 
contractor, missing as a result of hostile 
action, and establishes the conditions 
necessary to recover those who become 
isolated during operations.
DoDD 5110.10 
Defense Technical 
Information Center 
Central scientific, research, and engineering 
information support activity for the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) in facilitating his 
or her duties, in accordance with DoDD 
5134.3 (Reference (c)), and executing the 
programs and functions of the DoD Scientific 
and Technical Information Program (STIP), 
as specified in DoDD 3200.12 and DoD 
Instruction (DoDI) 3200.14 (References (d) 
and (e)). 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.73 
Defense 
Technology 
Security 
Administration 
Administer, consistent with U.S. policy, 
national security objectives, and Federal 
laws and regulations, the development and 
implementation of DoD technology 
security policies on international transfers 
of defense-related goods, services, and 
technologies to ensure that critical U.S. 
military technological advantages are 
preserved; transfers that could prove 
detrimental to U.S. security interests are 
controlled and limited; proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery is prevented; diversion 
of defense-related goods to terrorists is 
prevented; legitimate defense cooperation 
with foreign friends and allies is supported; 
and the health of the defense industrial 
base is assured. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.72 
DoD Education 
Activity 
The mission of DoDEA is to provide an 
exemplary education by effectively and 
efficiently planning, directing, and 
overseeing the management, operation, and 
administration of the DoD Domestic 
Dependent Elementary and Secondary 
Schools (DDESS) and the DoD 
Dependents Schools (DoDDS), which 
provide instruction from preschool through 
grade 12 to eligible dependents. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 1342.20 
DoD Human 
Resources Activity 
Enhances the operational effectiveness and 
efficiency of diverse programs supporting 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
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the Department of Defense. DoDHRA 
combines centralized management of 
operations and administrative oversight 
with decentralized program guidance. It 
supports policy development, develops 
products and services that promote and 
sustain a high performing workforce, 
performs research and analysis, supports 
readiness and departmental reengineering 
efforts, manages personnel data 
repositories, prepares future civilian leaders 
through developmental programs, supports 
recruiting and retention, and delivers both 
benefits and critical services to warfighters 
and their families. DoDHRA administers 
sexual assault prevention policies and 
programs, assists in establishing and 
administering language capabilities 
policies, and oversees central management 
of commercial travel. 
DoDD 5100.87 
DoD Test 
Resource 
Management 
Center 
Plan for and assess the adequacy of the 
Major Range and Test Facility Base 
(MRTFB), as defined by section 196 of 
reference (a) and, as described in DoD 
Directive 3200.11 (reference (b)), to 
provide adequate testing in support of 
development, acquisition, fielding, and 
sustainment of defense systems; and, 
maintain awareness of other T&E facilities 
and resources, within and outside the 
Department, and their impacts on DoD 
requirements. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5105.71 
Office of 
Economic 
Adjustment 
Provide assistance to communities, regions, 
and States adversely impacted by 
significant defense program changes 
including base closures, realignments, or 
expansions; defense industry cutbacks; 
encroachment; and personnel reductions or 
increases. 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 3030.01 
TRICARE 
Management 
Activity 
4.1. Manage TRICARE; 
4.2. Manage and execute the Defense 
Health Program (DHP) Appropriation and 
the 
DoD Unified Medical Program; and 
4.3. Support the Uniformed Services in 
implementation of the TRICARE Program 
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5136.12 
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and the Civilian Health and Medical 
Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS). 
Washington 
Headquarters 
Services 
Provide a broad range of administrative, 
management, and common support services, 
including human resources and security 
clearance services, facilities and facility 
operations, information technology (IT) 
capabilities and services, financial 
management, acquisition and contracting, 
and secure communications. It also provides 
oversight of designated DoD-wide statutory 
and regulatory programs, supporting DoD 
Components and other federal entities as 
directed and assigned. WHS operates and 
maintains the Pentagon Reservation and 
designated facilities in the National Capital 
Region (NCR).
U.S. Department of 
Defense Directive 
DoDD 5110.04 
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Appendix C.  Consolidated Results for IQ 2 (Using Lowest Rates) 
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1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel  
99800 11148 0.1117 11148 0 
51300 8006 0.1561 5730 2276 
21200 2866 0.1352 2368 498 
64400 9131 0.1418 7193 1938 
TOTAL 4712 
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel  
447800 27276 0.0609 26644 632 
266900 18840 0.0706 15881 2959 
176100 10478 0.0595 10478 0 
259700 17822 0.0686 15452 2370 
TOTAL 5961 
Civilian Personnel  
255900 9117 0.0356 9117 0 
188500 8140 0.0432 6711 1429 
23600 1658 0.0703 840 818 
184100 8360 0.0454 6554 1806 
TOTAL 4053 
Cadets  
4500 78 0.0173 77 1 
4500 77 0.0171 77 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
3900 70 0.0179 67 3 
TOTAL 4 
PCS Moves  
266800 1787 0.0067 1521 266 
162100 1031 0.0064 924 107 
99900 566 0.0057 566 0 
147300 1290 0.0088 840 450 
TOTAL 823 
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1. Air Operations 
Flying Hours  293000 731 0.0025 731 0 
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105400 6053 0.0057 2635 
3418 
117000 4778 0.0041 2925 1853 
TOTAL 5271 
Total Aircraft Inventory*  
1938 589 0.3039 589 0 
3983 3499 0.8785 1210 
2289 
5239 10773 2.0563 1592 9181 
TOTAL 11470 
2.2. Land Operations 
Divisions  
18 21117 1173.3 21117 0 
-- -- -- --  
4 5348 1337.0 4693 655 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL 655 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance  
111 84 0.7568 67 17 
-- -- -- --  
165 99 0.6000 99 0 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL 17 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit  
-- -- -- --  
9 239 26.555 71 168 
-- -- -- --  
62 489 7.887 489 0 
TOTAL 168 
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported  
220 115 0.5227 115 0 
134 86 0.6418 70 16 
-- -- -- --  
8 59 7.3750 4 55 
TOTAL 71 
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs  
2115 12 0.0057 12 0 
3194 60 0.01878 18 
42 
235 248 1.0553 1 247 
TOTAL 289 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Cost  808000 13034 0.0161 9938 3096 
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732000 8997 0.0123 8997 0 
512000 7810 0.0152 6298 1512 
TOTAL 4608 
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population  
808000 4138 0.0051 2343 1795 
511000 1464 0.0029 1464 0 
221000 689 0.0031 641 48 
512000 3521 0.0069 1485 2036 
TOTAL 3879 
Enlisted Recruits  
35600 581 0.0163 185 396 
29500 256 0.0085 153 103 
25500 187 0.0073 133 54 
28400 148 0.0052 148 0 
TOTAL 553 
2. Procurement 
3.1. Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft  
0 0 0 0 0 
48 5475 114.06 5475 0 
0 0 0 0  
19 3124 164.42 2167 957 
TOTAL 957 
Rotary Wing Aircraft  
179 4125 23.045 4125 0 
54 3096 57.333 1244 1852 
27 791 29.296 622 169 
4 294 73.500 92 202 
TOTAL 2223 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft  
2 19 9.500 19 0 
51 3586 70.314 485 3101 
0 0 0 0 0 
7 539 77.000 67 472 
TOTAL 3573 
Strategic UAVs  
19 534 28.105 396 138 
6 125 10.833 125 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
24 885 36.875 500 385 
TOTAL 523 
Aircraft Modifications (TAI) 
1938 1277 0.6588 987 290 
3983 2029 0.5094 2029 0 
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5239 3610 0.6891 2669 941 
TOTAL 1231 
Repair/Spare Parts & Support (TAI) 
1938 376 0.1940 376 0 
3983 1658 0.4162 773 885 
5239 2053 0.3919 1016 1037 
TOTAL 1922 
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles  
3831 506 0.1321 506 0 
-- -- -- --  
40 37 0.9325 5 32 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL 32 
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions  
-- -- -- --  
280 128 0.4571 46 82 
-- -- -- --  
3403 558 0.1640 558 0 
TOTAL 82 
Tactical Missiles  
2008 448 0.2231 448 0 
389 1017 2.6144 87 930 
-- -- -- --  
434 144 0.3318 97 47 
TOTAL 977 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars  
43 1338 31.116 1338 0 
9 390 43.333 280 110 
-- -- -- --  
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL 110 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained  
962 4017 4.1757 4017 0 
491 2101 4.2790 2049 52 
178 825 4.6348 743 82 
634 2646 4.1735 2646 0 
TOTAL 134 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained  
9888 530 0.0536 217 313 
5726 263 0.0459 125 138 
798 18 0.0226 17 1 
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26556 582 0.0219 582 0 
TOTAL 452 
TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS 55211 
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Appendix D.  Sensitivity Analysis for IQ 2 
(Benchmarked Budget Estimates using 2nd Lowest Rates from Table 7.) 
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1. Personnel 
Active Duty Officer Personnel  
99800 11148 0.1117 13493 +2345 
51300 8006 0.1561 6936 1070 
21200 2866 0.1352 2866 0 
64400 9131 0.1418 8707 424 
TOTAL +851 
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel  
447800 27276 0.0609 27276 0 
266900 18840 0.0706 16254 2586 
176100 10478 0.0595 10724 +246 
259700 17822 0.0686 15816 2006 
TOTAL 4346 
Civilian Personnel  
255900 9117 0.0356 11055 +1938 
188500 8140 0.0432 8140 0 
23600 1658 0.0703 1020 638 
184100 8360 0.0454 7953 407 
TOTAL +893 
Cadets  
4500 78 0.0173 78 0 
4500 77 0.0171 78 +1 
0 0 0 0 0 
3900 70 0.0179 67 3 
TOTAL 2 
PCS Moves  
266800 1787 0.0067 1708 79 
162100 1031 0.0064 1031 0 
99900 566 0.0057 639 +73 
147300 1290 0.0088 943 347 
TOTAL 353 
2. Operations and Maintenance 
2.1. Air Operations 
Flying Hours  293000 731 0.0025 1201 +470 
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1054000 6053 0.0057 4321 
1732 
1170000 4778 0.0041 4778 0 
TOTAL 1262 
Total Aircraft Inventory*  
1938 589 0.3039 1703 +1114 
3983 3499 0.8785 3499 
2289 
5239 10773 2.0563 4602 6171 
TOTAL 7346 
2.2. Land Operations 
Divisions  
18 21117 1173.3 24066 +2949 
-- -- -- --  
4 5348 1337.0 5348 0 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL +2949 
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance  
111 84 0.7568 84 0 
-- -- -- --  
165 99 0.6000 125 +26 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL +26 
2.3.  Space Operations 
Supported Satellites in Orbit  
-- -- -- --  
9 239 26.555 239 0 
-- -- -- --  
62 489 7.887 1646 +1157 
TOTAL +1157 
2.4.  Air and Missile Defense Operations 
Interceptors/Radars Supported  
220 115 0.5227 141 +26 
134 86 0.6418 86 0 
-- -- -- --  
8 59 7.3750 5 54 
TOTAL 28 
2.5.  ISR Operations 
UAVs  
2115 12 0.0057 40 +28 
3194 60 0.01878 60 
0 
235 248 1.0553 4 244 
TOTAL 216 
2.6.  Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support  Activities 
Total Cost  808000 13034 0.0161 12282 752 
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732000 8997 0.0123 11126 +2129 
512000 7810 0.0152 7810 0 
TOTAL +1377 
2.7.   Recruiting and Training 
Total Training Population  
808000 4138 0.0051 2505 1633 
511000 1464 0.0029 1584 +120 
221000 689 0.0031 689 0 
512000 3521 0.0069 1485 1587 
TOTAL 3100 
Enlisted Recruits  
35600 581 0.0163 260 321 
29500 256 0.0085 215 41 
25500 187 0.0073 187 0 
28400 148 0.0052 207 +59 
TOTAL 303 
2. Procurement 
3.1. Aircraft 
Fighter/Attack Aircraft  
-- -- -- --  
48 5475 114.06 7892 +2417 
-- -- -- --  
19 3124 164.42 3124 0 
TOTAL +2417 
Rotary Wing Aircraft  
179 4125 23.045 5244 +1119 
54 3096 57.333 1582 1514 
27 791 29.296 791 0 
4 294 73.500 117 177 
TOTAL 572 
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft  
2 19 9.500 141 +122 
51 3586 70.314 3586 3101 
-- -- -- --  
7 539 77.000 492 47 
TOTAL 3026 
Strategic UAVs  
19 534 28.105 534 0 
6 125 10.833 169 +44 
0 0 0 0 0 
24 885 36.875 675 210 
TOTAL 166 
 
1938 1277 0.6588 1277 0 
3983 2029 0.5094 2624 +595 
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Aircraft Modifications (TAI) 5239 3610 0.6891 3451 159 
TOTAL +436 
Repair/Spare Parts & Support (TAI) 
1938 376 0.1940 760 +384 
3983 1658 0.4162 1561 97 
5239 2053 0.3919 2053 0 
TOTAL +287 
3.2.  Land Vehicles 
Tactical/Support Vehicles  
3831 506 0.1321 3572 +3066 
-- -- -- --  
40 37 0.9325 37 0 
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL +3066 
3.3.  Munitions and Missiles 
Air to Ground Munitions  
-- -- -- --  
280 128 0.4571 128 0 
-- -- -- --  
3403 558 0.1640 1556 +998 
TOTAL +998 
Tactical Missiles  
2008 448 0.2231 666 +218 
389 1017 2.6144 129 888 
-- -- -- --  
434 144 0.3318 144 0 
TOTAL 670 
3.4.   Air and Missile Defense 
Interceptors/Radars  
43 1338 31.116 1863 +525 
9 390 43.333 390 0 
-- -- -- --  
-- -- -- --  
TOTAL +525 
4.  Military Construction 
Square Feet Maintained  
962 4017 4.1757 4017 0 
491 2101 4.2790 2050 51 
178 825 4.6348 743 82 
634 2646 4.1735 2647 +1 
TOTAL 132 
5.  Family Housing 
Adequate Housing Units Maintained  
9888 530 0.0536 223 307 
5726 263 0.0459 129 134 
798 18 0.0226 18 0 
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26556 582 0.0219 600 +18 
TOTAL 423 
TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS 6963 
 
* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus 
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI. 
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